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In the summer of 2010, the Review Conference of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) met in Kampala, 
Uganda.1 The Review Conference covered, among other topics, the 
ongoing work of the Working Group for the Crime of Aggression, an 
advisory body tasked with outlining the definition and procedures of 
the crime of aggression, which until then existed only as a 
placeholder in the Rome Statute.2 The Review Conference was also 
the place for states parties to propose amendments to the Rome 
Statute.3  
The Netherlands made such a proposal—submitting documents in 
advance of the conference recommending that the “crime of 
terrorism” be added to the jurisdiction of the court.4 This suggestion 
is not new. Terrorism, along with other crimes, particularly drug-
related crimes, was considered, but rejected, when the Rome Statute 
was drafted in 1998.5 At that time, the crime of terrorism was 
determined to be inappropriate for the jurisdiction of the 
 
 1. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 123, July 17, 
1998-Dec. 31, 2000, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (providing for a 
review conference seven years after the Statute’s entry into force). For information 
on the proposals before the Review Conference, see Review Conference of the 
Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ ASP/ReviewConfe 
rence/(last updated Dec. 23, 2010). 
 2. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5.2 (“The Court shall exercise jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with 
articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which 
the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision 
shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations.”). 
 3. Id. art. 123.1. 
 4. Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 8th Sess. at Annex II, ¶¶ 40-51, I.C.C. Doc. ICC-ASP/8/20 (Nov. 18-26, 
2009) [hereinafter Assembly of Parties to the Rome Statute]; id. app. III. 
 5. See generally ROBERTA ARNOLD, THE ICC AS A NEW INSTRUMENT FOR 
REPRESSING TERRORISM 53-57 (2004). 
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International Criminal Court.6 However, shortly before the statute of 
the International Criminal Court entered into force, the world 
confronted the specter of international terrorism with the events of 
September 11, 2001, followed by the Madrid train bombings, and the 
London bus bombings.7 Is the crime of terrorism still, if it was ever, 
inappropriate for the world’s highest criminal court? Or is there 
another way for the international community to combat terrorism? 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. WHAT IS TERRORISM? 
No paper on the crime of terrorism would be complete without the 
introductory observation that its definition is not generally agreed 
upon. The most common reason cited for this lack of consensus is 
that an individual’s political ideology and national origins dictate 
who he or she considers to be a terrorist, and thus any definition is 
too subjective because “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter.”8 Of course, properly considered, that is not a definitional 
problem, but a problem of application. The definition of terrorism, in 
order to encompass all offenders that are abhorrent to the 
international system as they innovate new tactics and embrace new 
causes, could include some groups who certain states deem to be 
using so-called “violence for good,” such as in a struggle to throw 
off an oppressor or to conduct a just war.9 
Terrorism is commonly understood as “a violent and intimidating 
act—usually directed against innocent targets—and aimed at 
coercing a government or a community to comply with the 
 
 6. See id. at 55 (noting that the main argument against the inclusion of 
terrorism and other similar crimes was the lack of universal acceptance of the 
treaties defining those crimes). 
 7. Timeline: Al-Qaeda, BBC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/7546355.stm. 
 8. ARNOLD, supra note 5, at 3-4; see also Antonio Cassese, Terrorism as an 
International Crime, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST 
TERRORISM 213, 214 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004) (arguing that excluding “freedom 
fighters” from the definition of terrorism is a function of the international 
community’s inability to agree on exceptions to the definition—not the inability to 
define what terrorism is). 
 9. Cassese, supra note 8, at 217 (stating that the First Additional Protocol of 
1977 to the Geneva Conventions avoided the problem by labeling “freedom 
fighters” as “combatants” instead of “terrorists”). 
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perpetrators’ political requests.”10 This definition is not easily 
translated into legal terminology,11 yet many countries have enacted 
criminal terrorism proscriptions. The United States defines 
international terrorism as: 
“activities that . . . involve violent acts . . . [that] appear to be intended, (i) 
to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of 
a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of 
a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping [in a way 
that] transcend[s] national boundaries . . . .”12  
In fact, the U.S. Code contains over a dozen different, and not 
necessarily synonymous, definitions of terrorism.13 The international 
community has defined specific acts of terrorism in no less than 
thirteen sectoral conventions, banning the specific acts of, inter alia, 
aircraft hijacking, aircraft bombing, hostage taking, and the financing 
of terrorist groups.14 The sectoral conventions are backward-looking 
 
 10. ARNOLD, supra note 5, at 4. 
 11. See id. at 5 (suggesting international humanitarian law as a basis for a legal 
definition of terrorism). 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2006). 
 13. See ELIZABETH MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21021, “TERRORISM” 
AND RELATION TERMS IN STATUTE AND REGULATION: SELECTED LANGUAGE 
(2006) (excerpting samples of a few statutory definitions of “terrorism” in the 
United States Code); Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions 
of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 249-50 (2004) 
(characterizing nineteen distinct definitions of terrorism present in the U.S. Code 
as either “deductive”—covering a wide variety of criminal conduct but only under 
narrow circumstances where the perpetrator has a politically oriented intent—or 
“inductive”—using a rather precise list of conduct but omitting the political intent 
requirement). 
 14. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board 
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941; Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, December 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641; Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 
1971, 24 U.S.T. 564; Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975; 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 
U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, opened 
for signature Mar. 3, 1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 124; Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, 
Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474; Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 
1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
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for the most part; they condemn acts of terrorism which have already 
been perpetrated, rather than looking ahead with more encompassing 
definitions.15 In the 1970s, the U.N. General Assembly attempted, 
without success, to come up with a definition of terrorism that would 
not apply to freedom fighters and combatants in anti-colonial 
movements.16 Until 2005, there was great support for a 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism,17 but 
negotiations stalled over the definition of terrorism.18 Negotiating 
states differed over the definition’s inclusion or exclusion of 
collateral civilian losses during warfare, resistance to occupation, and 
national liberation movements.19 There was an attempt to build 
consensus by completing the remainder of the convention and 
returning to the definition at a later stage, but this effort failed to 
yield a definition as well.20 One of the last drafts of the convention 
circulated in 2005 gave the following proscription for terrorism: 
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of the present 
Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, 
causes: 
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or 
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of 
public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation 
 
the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 
1678 U.N.T.S. 201; Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the 
Purpose of Detection, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1991, 2122 U.N.T.S. 359; 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 
1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256; International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197; International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Apr. 13, 2005, 2445 
U.N.T.S. 89. 
 15. Cf. ARNOLD, supra note 5, at 9-27 (discussing the passage of conventions 
in response to air hijacking, hostage taking, piracy and maritime terrorism, and 
bombings). 
 16. STEPHEN DYCUS, WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, 
COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 6 (2007). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See id. (referencing an agenda-setting document which, to avoid the 
controversy, deleted the definitional language). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. (noting that the ensuing General Assembly resolution “condemn[ed] 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,” but did not define such “forms and 
manifestations”). 
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system, an infrastructure facility or to the environment; or 
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in 
paragraph 1 (b) of the present article resulting or likely to result in 
major economic loss;  
when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate 
a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization 
to do or to abstain from doing any act. 
2. Any person also commits an offence if that person makes a credible 
and serious threat to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of the 
present article.21 
From this and other definitions, there is a discernable pattern: the 
generally-agreed elements are serious violence, a political motive, an 
international element, and the creation of extreme fear.22 Two 
controversial subjects in the definition of terrorism are “freedom 
fighters,” and whether states actors can commit terrorism—a 
question which often translates to whether collateral damage in 
armed conflict can be labeled terrorism.23  
B. IS TERRORISM A CRIME AGAINST THE LAW OF NATIONS? 
One of the liveliest debates in international criminal law today is 
whether the crime of terrorism has emerged as a true international 
crime. Learned international criminal scholars Antonio Cassese and 
the late Thomas M. Franck conclude that it is,24 though many others 
say that it is not.25 The reality seems to be that, despite disagreement, 
the crime of terrorism has not developed a complete pedigree as an 
 
 21. Chairman of the Sixth Comm. of the General Assembly, Letter dated Aug. 
3, 2005 from the Chairman of the Sixth Comm. Addressed to the President of the 
General Assembly, app. II, U.N. Doc. A/59/894 (Aug. 12, 2005). 
 22. BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 59-63 (2006). 
 23. See id. at 63 (arguing, however, that when an alleged act of terrorism 
occurs during an armed conflict, international humanitarian law is the most 
appropriate legal framework). 
 24. Cassese, supra note 8, at 214; see Thomas M. Franck & Deborah 
Niedermeyer, Accommodating Terrorism: An Offense Against the Law of Nations, 
19 ISRAEL YEARBOOK HUM. RTS. 75, 100 (1989) (internationalizing the crime by 
tying it to a state’s accommodation of those “who use force to inflict harm [on 
other states]”). 
 25. Cassese, supra note 8, at 213 n.4. 
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international crime (perhaps leading to its ultimate non-inclusion in 
the Rome Statute), but it could very well crystallize as one at some 
point in the future.26  
The ICC’s predecessors—the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)—proscribed only the crime of 
genocide, violations of the law of war (war crimes), and crimes 
against humanity.27 At the time of the drafting of the Rome Statute, 
terrorism was still considered a “treaty crime”—a crime proscribed 
in international law by virtue of agreement between states, rather 
than because it is an inherent violation of a norm of the international 
community.28 The negotiating parties’ decision to limit the Statute to 
four core crimes and to drop the “treaty crimes” provision was based 
on the conclusions that only the core crimes enjoyed clear status as 
jus cogens under customary international law, that the inclusion of 
crimes such as international drug trafficking and terrorism would 
prevent final agreement and ratification of the Rome Statute, and that 
there was no generally accepted definition of the crime of terrorism.29 
 
 26. See Robert Kolb, The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction over International 
Terrorists, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM, 
supra note 8, at 227, 272 (presenting competing lines of scholarly thought on the 
question of whether universal jurisdiction exists for terrorist crimes); Reuven 
Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in 
International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 23, 101-02 (2006) (“Rather than continue to attempt 
to establish a universal jurisdiction with respect to terrorism, the international 
community . . . opted for a system whereby states exercise domestic criminal 
jurisdiction over acts of terrorism.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987) (noting the potential for 
universal jurisdiction over certain acts of terrorism as a matter of customary law); 
PRINCETON UNIV. PROGRAM IN LAW AND PUB. AFFAIRS, THE PRINCETON 
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 29 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001) 
(excluding terrorism from the list of “serious crimes under international law,” 
which would carry with them universal jurisdiction, notwithstanding its otherwise 
progressive interpretation of international criminal law). 
 27. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 5-8; Updated Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia arts. 2-5, amended July 7, 2009, 
available at http://www.icty.org/sid/135; Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 995, arts. 2-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/995 (Nov. 8, 
1994) (including “acts of terrorism” under art. 4—“Violations of Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II”). 
 28. ARNOLD, supra note 5, at 59. 
 29. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN 
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The above led the negotiators to conclude, fatally, that the crime of 
terrorism and other treaty crimes have yet to find universal 
acceptance as violations of the law of nations.30 In other words, 
unlike the other international crimes, it is not agreed that universal 
jurisdiction exists for crimes of terrorism.31  
Implicit in that argument, and stated explicitly by some of those 
who negotiated the Rome Statute, is the notion that crimes that do 
not carry universal jurisdiction are fundamentally different than those 
that do.32 Most countries agree that terrorism, drug trafficking, 
attacks on U.N. personnel, human trafficking, and other similarly 
abhorrent treaty crimes are worthy of near universal proscription; 
however, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
aggression have a special and lofty place in the hierarchy of 
inherently criminal acts.33 These acts constitute a violation of the law 
of nations because they are committed against the international 
order.34  
To explain this concept further, international criminal law 
luminary M. Cherif Bassiouni noted that international criminal law is 
the convergence of two kinds of law: criminal aspects of 
international law (e.g., crimes against the international order, such as 
genocide or aggression) and international aspects of national criminal 
law (e.g., crimes proscribed by national laws and with an 
international dimension, but not directed at the international order, 
such as drug trafficking, and—this article suggests—terrorism).35 
 
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 
212 (2d ed. 2001); see Rep. of the Ad hoc Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l 
Criminal Court, ¶ 81, U.N. Doc. A/50/22; GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22 (1995) 
(arguing for the exclusion of treaty-based crimes because effective mechanisms are 
already in place and their inclusion would overburden the ICC); ARNOLD, supra 
note 5, at 56 (referencing the fear that the inclusion of terrorism would have 
polarized the ICC). 
 30. ARNOLD, supra note 5, at 55. 
 31. Id. at 56. 
 32. Id. at 58-59. 
 33. See id. at 58 (distinguishing these crimes as part of general international 
law because they are not simply derivations of national crimes applied in an 
international setting, but are crimes of particular international concern); see also 
Lyal S. Sunga, The Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the International Court (Part 
II, Articles 5-10), 6 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L., & CRIM. JUST. 61, 66 (1998). 
 34. ARNOLD, supra, note 5, at 58. 
 35. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Characteristics of International Criminal Law 
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The first kind of crime is truly international crime, while the second 
is more accurately understood as transnational crime. Transnational 
crime is geographically international but offends the international 
order only in the sense that nearly all states are concerned with the 
crime and must work together to suppress it.  
C. TRANSNATIONAL VERSUS INTERNATIONAL CRIME 
 1. Who Commits the Crime? 
Truly international crime involves the participation of the officials 
of the state itself at the highest levels. The decision to participate in 
aggression, for example, can only be made by the authority of a 
state.36 Likewise, war crimes, either in an international or a civil war, 
involve the meeting of two large fighting forces and often the 
participation of multiple state leaderships.37 Crimes against humanity 
and genocide need not be specifically ordered or carried out by the 
apparatus of a state,38 but they must necessarily involve a failure of 
the state to suppress these acts, and the acts must be occurring to 
such a degree that they are widespread or systematic, or on a scale 
great enough that they could destroy a defined group in whole or in 
part.39 Both crimes against humanity and genocide are likely to occur 
in times of interstate conflict. 
Transnational crime is, by contrast, generally conducted by private 
parties that states are working to suppress. Terrorists, though they 
may at times receive illicit support from sympathetic states, are 
usually private persons who engage in violence that is directed at 
making their government or a neighboring government act or not act 
 
Conventions, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 1, 1 (M. Cherif 
Bassiouni ed., 1986). 
 36. See Rev. Conf. of the Rome Statute, 13th plenary meeting, June 11, 2010, 
I.C.C. Doc. RC/Res.6, Annex I, art. 8(1) [hereinafter RC/Res.6] (“‘[C]rime of 
aggression’ means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in 
a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”). 
 37. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8. 
 38. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 91, ¶ 166 
(Feb. 26) (reasoning that because genocide is a crime under international law, 
states parties have an obligation to prevent it). 
 39. Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 6-7. 
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in a certain way.40 Drug trafficking flouts the authority of a state by 
moving illicit substances without state permission, subverting the 
state’s legal controls.41 Piracy, though it has developed a pedigree as 
an international crime,42 functions as transnational crime.43 Piracy is 
an act by private persons directed against private ships in 
contravention of state authority or outside of the normal enforcement 
abilities of states.44 Drug trafficking and piracy are driven by profit 
rather than political motives. 
The difference in who commits international versus transnational 
crimes shows the greater danger that international crime poses to the 
international system at large. For an international crime, often 
 
 40. See SAUL, supra note 22, at 63-64 (suggesting that because terrorist acts are 
committed during peacetime, a definition of terrorism should encompass the “acts 
of both State officials and non-State actors” in order to “maintain moral symmetry” 
and reinforce the definition’s legitimacy). 
 41. Compare Johan David Michels, Keeping Dealers off the Docket: The Perils 
of Prosecuting Serious Drug-Related Offences at the International Criminal Court, 
21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 449, 452 (2009), with Molly McConville, Note, A Global War 
on Drugs: Why the United States Should Support the Prosecution of Drug 
Traffickers in the International Criminal Court, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 75, 76 
(2000). 
 42. Leticia M. Diaz & Barry Hart Dubner, On the Evolution of the Law of 
International Sea Piracy: How Property Trumped Human Rights, the Environment 
and the Sovereign Rights of States in the Areas of the Creation and Enforcement of 
Jurisdiction,13 BARRY L. REV. 175 (2009). See generally BARRY HART DUBNER, 
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY (1980). 
 43. Despite being a crime against nations and, thus, generally subject to 
universal jurisdiction, piracy is not within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Again, this 
suggests that the ICC is not the appropriate forum for crime with the features of 
transnational crime, whether categorized as a crime against nations or not. 
 44. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction 
of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph 
(a) or (b). 
Id. 
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someone with state authority is perpetrating a wrong, and so the only 
higher authority that can suppress the action is the international 
community of states. With transnational crime, the wrong is 
conducted below the state level. States may fail to effectively 
suppress the crime, but states also fail to achieve perfect results with 
the suppression of any kind of domestic, ordinary crime. While a few 
states may refuse to suppress terrorism or even abet terrorists, those 
situations are the only ones in which international terrorism is similar 
to other kinds of truly international crime. 
2. Scale 
The definition of terrorism poses a problem for ICC jurisdiction 
because a single event can qualify as an act of terrorism. Unlike 
genocide or crimes against humanity, which are necessarily massive 
in scale, there can be such a thing as “a little terrorism.” While the 
classic model of terrorism, such as that seen in the Irish Republican 
Army in Ireland or the National Liberation Front in Algeria, involved 
hierarchical structures coordinating a paramilitary strategy, the 
model of al-Qaeda and other modern terrorist organizations lacks any 
real hierarchy at all.45 Osama bin Laden and his immediate 
supporters broadcast a message that gives general guidance on 
planning acts of terrorism,46 but individual people or small groups 
with no connection to al-Qaeda can then decide for themselves 
whether and how they will stage attacks to support the al-Qaeda 
cause.47 As such, some acts of terrorism have as few as a single 
person involved, relatively small numbers of casualties, and may be 
planned and carried out in a small domestic locality. The issue of the 
scale of terrorism introduces another unique challenge: when the 
 
 45. The international community’s increased efforts to fight hierarchical 
terrorism have reduced terrorist capacity and placed more emphasis on small, 
independent groups, which are bolstered by modern communications technology. 
Terrorism has also changed from the earlier hierarchical model of the 1970s and 
1980s by becoming more violent, less discriminate, and less proportional in the 
1990s. The movements have also become less directly political in their demands; 
instead of seeking control of specific territory, terrorism can now have a more 
amorphous message, such as general Anti-Americanism. See DYCUS, BANKS & 
RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 16, at 4-5. 
 46. See generally BEN VENZKE & AIMEE IBRAHIM, THE AL-QAEDA THREAT: 
AN ANALYTICAL GUIDE TO AL-QAEDA’S TACTICS AND TARGETS (2003) 
(considering a number of interviews and broadcasts made by al-Qaeda members). 
 47. Id. 
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crime is more domestic than international, can it still be called 
international terrorism?48  
Furthermore, international and transnational crimes differ in scale. 
While there is no doubt a significant amount of drug trafficking and 
other kinds of transnational crime ongoing, the volume of 
transnational crime is best understood as an aggregation of a number 
of independently committed criminal acts. Some crimes are large-
scale, some are exceedingly small operations. International crimes, 
on the other hand, involve either the invasion of another country or 
the aggregation of a great number of small acts into a single plan to 
commit genocide, perpetrate war crimes, or commit crimes against 
humanity (which must also be widespread or systematic in order to 
qualify for the Rome Statute and other criminal tribunal 
definitions49).  
Finally, even terrorist crimes that are relatively small in terms of 
number of casualties can have large political intimidation effects. For 
example, the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri was sufficiently politically important that it led to the 
establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, a hybrid 
international court with jurisdiction over what was technically an act 
of terrorism.50 It is not clear how to draft a definition for terrorism 
that would separate “big” international terrorism from “small” 
terrorism, and would allow an international court to adjudicate such 
cases without docket-flooding on the one hand, or jurisdictional 
unavailability on the other. 
 
 48. While many scholars distinguish international and domestic terrorism, 
claiming that only international terrorism is of concern to the international 
community and perhaps only international terrorism is an international crime, this 
article disagrees with strict delineation between the two. Even if a terrorist 
movement is directly against a state by nationals, there are exceedingly few cases 
in which international movements or policies are not implicated. Additionally, 
wide-scale terrorist violence in a single country is still a threat to the peace and 
security of the international community. For this reason, domestic and international 
terrorism should be viewed as one phenomenon. But see SAUL, supra note 22, at 
47 (suggesting that even some acts of international terrorism may not be significant 
enough to affect “international peace and security” under the U.N. Charter). 
 49. E.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 (“For the purpose of this Statute, 
"crime against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population . . . 
.”). 
 50. S.C. Res. 1757, Annex, art. 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1757 (May 30, 2007). 
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 3. Reprehensibility 
Widespread or systematic attacks on civilian populations, attacks 
on civilians during wartime, attempts to destroy an ethnic group in 
whole or in part, and unjustified aggression toward another country 
are all actions that tend to arouse disgust and hatred in the 
international community. Indeed, the consensus of the international 
community is that these actions are never permissible for any 
reason.51 Politically motivated attacks on civilians, while still 
detested, have not crystallized as totally impermissible acts.52 
Countries with colonial histories often owe their independence to 
national liberation groups who were willing to use such tactics to 
fight the superior military power of their oppressors.53 In short, while 
actors in the international system are completely forbidden from 
committing genocide for any reason, they are forbidden from 
attacking civilians for political purposes only most of the time. 
Furthermore, leaders of attributed national liberation organizations, 
whom some deem terrorists, have not been excluded from 
participation in the international community—for example, Gerry 
Adams of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland and Nelson 
Mandela of the African National Congress in South Africa.54 
Much of the scholarship that suggests adding terrorism or other 
crimes to the jurisdiction of the ICC focuses on the belief that 
terrorism is one of the world’s most reprehensible crimes.55 It may 
 
 51. The prohibitions on actions such as genocide may well be considered 
peremptory norms or jus cogens in the international system. For a detailed 
discussion of peremptory norms, see generally LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY 
NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, 
CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS (1988). 
 52. See Cassese, supra note 8, at 213-14 (outlining the debate to except 
“freedom fighters” from the definition of terrorism). 
 53. See SAUL, supra note 22, at 116-20 (advancing arguments that justify 
certain terrorist acts when part of a rebellion against an oppressive regime). 
 54. Id. at 121. 
 55. This suggestion is often achieved by illustrating how acts of terrorism can 
be categorized under the statutory definition of crimes against humanity. E.g., 
Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the International 
Criminal Court as a Legal Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 15 
(2003); Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal 
Court: Possibilities and Problems, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 2 (2002); Christian Much, 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Terrorism as an International Crime, 
14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 121, 127 (2006). 
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very well be that, at the time the Rome Statute was adopted, the 
international community wished to distinguish the aforementioned 
four crimes by identifying them, and them alone, as the most 
reprehensible. Indeed, the definition of a “crime against nations” 
depends on the consensus on the international community to view the 
actions in that way, not on the threat level or inherent moral 
reprehensibility of the action.56  
We need not accept the view that simply because a crime is not 
included in the Rome Statute it does not deserve the greatest moral 
condemnation, or great attention from the community of states. 
There are great differences between transnational crimes, like 
terrorism, and international crimes, such as genocide, which might 
impact the decision on how acts of terrorism should be tried. This 
decision should perhaps be based on practical considerations rather 
than the need for moral clarity. Likewise, by acknowledging that 
transnational crime threatens international peace and security, we 
need not accept that terrorism or narcotrafficking affects the 
international community in the same way that genocide or aggression 
does.  
Many scholars have argued that terrorism is technically already 
included in the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court; 
certain acts of terrorism may be considered war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, or genocide.57 These arguments are clever, and 
have some analogical support in the opinions of the international 
criminal tribunals,58 but it might require some of the worst legalese to 
begin trying those whom we know to be terrorists as war criminals. 
Terrorism is a distinct and discrete phenomenon in the international 
system. Reading terrorism into another crime’s definition would 
involve exactly the kind of twisting of legal definitions and statutory 
overreaching that first made states uneasy about the existence of an 
 
 56. EDWARD M. WISE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 43-44, 58-62 (2d ed. 2004). 
 57. See, e.g., supra note 55. 
 58. E.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 158, 
172 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. 
Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 496 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998). In both cases, though rape was not listed under the 
relevant article of the ICTY Statute, the court permitted prosecution of it as torture 
or inhumane treatment. 
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International Criminal Court.59 This move would constitute a direct 
contravention of the will of the negotiating parties who chose to 
exclude terrorism from the Rome Statute. If we wish to make 
terrorism a crime under the ICC, then let us explicitly add the crime 
to the court’s jurisdiction. If not, then let us find another way.  
D. THE NETHERLANDS’ PROPOSAL 
The Netherlands’ Proposal to include the crime of terrorism in the 
Rome Statute is a short one. The Netherlands states that terrorism is 
a threat to international peace and security, and that international 
accountability is imperative when states with jurisdiction are unable 
or unwilling to prosecute alleged terrorists.60 The proposal 
acknowledges that there are definitional problems with terrorism, 
and suggests adding the crime of terrorism to the Rome Statute as a 
placeholder while a new working group discusses how to integrate 
the crime into the court, both by definition and in terms of any 
special procedures.61 As noted above, the ICC has already had one 
such placeholder and working group, for the crime of aggression.62 
To discuss whether this proposal is a good one, this article turns to an 
evaluation of the efforts of the Working Group for the Crime of 
Aggression in the next section. 
The Netherlands’ proposal also acknowledges that terrorism may 
already be a crime in the ICC’s jurisdiction; per the above discussion 
of legalese and statutory overreaching, this article discounts that as a 
viable possibility. 
Notably, the proposal that the Netherlands advanced for the 2010 
meeting is one that they have advanced before, without success, 
when the Rome Statute was under negotiation.63 Despite the many 
interceding years and the manner in which the events of September 
11, 2001 have refocused global security concerns on the threat of 
terrorism, the Netherlands’ proposal failed again to achieve any 
significant support, and was shelved for consideration at a later date.  
 
 59. See David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal 
Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 12, 14 (1999) (emphasizing the need for precise 
definitions which codify only existing customary international law). 
 60. Assembly of Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 4, Annex I, ¶ 41. 
 61. Id. ¶¶ 41-42. 
 62. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5, ¶ 2. 
 63. See Kolb, supra note 26, at 279-80. 
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E. THE WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION  
The international community has been working on a definition for 
the crime of aggression since the Nuremberg Trials after World War 
II, and even earlier.64 The fact that an uneasy consensus took twelve 
years to reach even after the drafting of the Rome Statute 
forebodingly suggests a similar fate for the hypothetical crime of 
terrorism. Negotiations over the definition of the crime of aggression 
occurred in several phases, including a failed attempt by the 
International Law Commission in the years after World War II, three 
decades of General Assembly debates from the 1950s to 1970s, and 
preparations for the negotiation of the Rome Statute in the 1990s.65 
In 1998, the international community decided to kick the can down 
the road once more by leaving a placeholder in the Rome Statute.66  
In the twelve interceding years, the Working Group for the Crime 
of Aggression was tasked to come up with a universally agreed upon 
definition.67 Ultimately a compromise was reached and a definition 
accepted, with the following elements: 
Article 8 bis: Crime of Aggression 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity 
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of 
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following 
acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United 
 
 64. See generally OSCAR SOLERA, DEFINING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
(2007). 
 65. E.g., id. at 12. 
 66. Id. at 356. 
 67. See Chairman of the Working Group on the Crime of Non-Aggression, 
Non-paper by the Chairman on the Elements of Crimes, ¶ 1 (May 28, 2009), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/SWGCA/Non-paper-
Elements-of-the-CoA-28May2009-ENG.pdf (intending to facilitate discussion on 
the draft elements of the crime of aggression, first proposed and circulated in 
2002). 
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Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 
1974, qualify as an act of aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the 
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however 
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation 
by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory 
of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the 
territory of another State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces 
of another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air 
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory 
of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in 
contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any 
extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of 
the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at 
the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for 
perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or 
its substantial involvement therein.68 
Whether this definition solves the many issues that prolonged the 
codification of the crime of aggression remains to be seen. 
The crime of aggression poses a unique problem in the community 
of states. Unlike other crimes, it can absolutely only apply to the 
highest political authorities of a state and to their political 
decisions.69 Many states are concerned that the chosen definition of 
 
 68. RC/Res.6, supra note 36, Annex I. 
 69. Compare id. Annex I, element 2 (requiring the perpetrator’s ability to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a state), with 
Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 6-8 (excluding an official capacity requirement 
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aggression could outlaw the benign decisions of states, particularly a 
decision of one state to enter another for humanitarian reasons, 
anticipatory self-defense, self-determination, peacekeeping and 
global law enforcement, or a small-scale territorial incursion.70  
The crime of aggression suffers from definitional and application 
issues similar to those that plague the crime of terrorism. States are 
concerned that actions which they consider to be benign or legal may 
fall within an all-encompassing technical definition.71 As noted 
above, some states consider humanitarian intervention or anticipatory 
self-defense, inter alia, to be an improper interference with territorial 
sovereignty under the U.N. Charter that should trigger liability for 
the crime of aggression, whereas other states do not.72  
One of the ways that states could have protected allegedly benign 
behavior from falling under the technical definition of aggression is 
by constricting the conditions under which the ICC could exercise its 
jurisdiction. Under Article 13 of the Rome Statute, jurisdiction can 
be exercised through referral by a state party, referral by the U.N. 
Security Council (“Security Council”), or upon an independent 
investigation of the ICC Prosecutor.73 The Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression considered two special mechanisms to protect 
benign state action: requiring the consent of the alleged aggressor 
state before exercising jurisdiction (unless the case is referred by the 
Security Council under its U.N. Charter Chapter VII power), or 
 
from the definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes). 
 70. See SOLERA, supra note 64, at 409-435 (considering a definition of the 
crime of aggression by evaluating possible defenses to such a charge); Sean D. 
Murphy, Criminalizing Humanitarian Intervention, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
341, 346-48 (2009) (referencing historical opposition to any form of unauthorized 
aggression, but noting arguments for the emergence of a “legal norm in favor of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention”). 
 71. See SOLERA, supra note 64, at 347-50 (reviewing delegations’ proposals for 
the crime of aggression and raising concerns about several trends therein, such as 
the tendency for states parties to conflate “aggression” with the broader notion of 
“breaching the peace” under the U.N. Charter). Solera also discusses the ongoing 
debate of whether the threat of aggression can be equated with the actual act—
ultimately concluding that the most sensible approach is to view threats as 
evidence of intent to commit aggression, but alone insufficient to constitute the 
crime of aggression. Id. 
 72. E.g., Murphy, supra note 70, at 346-48. 
 73. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13. 
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imposing an advance jurisdictional filter.74 Proposals for advance 
jurisdictional filters suggested the requirement that other 
international bodies—the Security Council, the Pre-Trial Chamber of 
the ICC, the General Assembly, or the International Court of 
Justice—refer a case of aggression or determine that there has been 
aggression before the case is given to the ICC Prosecutor.75  
Some scholars and government officials, having reflected on the 
work of the Working Group, came to oppose adding the crime of 
aggression to the statute at all—with or without any such special 
procedural protections.76 There is a strong possibility that the recent 
addition of the crime of aggression to the Rome Statute will result in 
a number of states exercising their right not to be bound by the new 
article,77 choosing to leave the Rome Statute altogether,78 or, in the 
case of current non-parties, being further dissuaded from acceding to 
the court.79 Countries such as the United States (current non-party), 
the United Kingdom (party), and Belgium (party) are concerned 
about an inability to exercise humanitarian intervention;80 and the 
United States may be concerned about its active worldwide 
military—particularly its low-level military operations against 
terrorists, narcotraffickers, and paramilitaries—and its pseudo-law 
enforcement activities undertaken in foreign territory (including 
 
 74. Chairman of the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Non-paper 
by the Chairman on the Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction, ¶ 6 (May 28, 
2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/SWGCA/Non-paper-
conditions-jurisdiction-28May2009-ENG.pdf. 
 75. Id. at ¶¶ 13-19. 
 76. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Aggression, Legitimacy, and the International 
Criminal Court, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1147, 1147 (2009) (perceiving problems with 
the proposed draft amendment on the crime of aggression, particularly with regard 
to “long-term prospects for the legitimacy of the definition of the crime and of the 
institutional structures charged with administering it”). 
 77. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121, ¶ 5 (prohibiting the ICC from 
exercising jurisdiction over new crimes or new definitions of existing crimes when 
the state party whose nationals are implicated or upon whose territory the crime 
occurred has yet to accept the amendment). 
 78. See id. art. 127 (allowing for voluntary withdrawal); id. art. 121, ¶ 6 
(allowing for immediate withdrawal from the statute during a one year period 
following the adoption of an amendment). 
 79. The Statute strongly suggests that only current states parties have the 
option to reject the addition or amendment of crimes, though the instrument is not 
wholly unambiguous on this point. See id. art. 121, ¶ 5. 
 80. Murphy, supra note 70, at 348. 
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internationally-unpopular extraordinary renditions).81 Some states 
may argue that these actions should be condemned or punished, but 
those arguments will drive the world’s most powerful states away 
from building international consensus on either the definition of 
aggression or the value of the ICC. Thus, the efforts of the Working 
Group for the Crime of Aggression give reason for great pause and 
skepticism before advocating for a working group to resolve 
longstanding definitional and application issues with the crime of 
terrorism. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF AN INTERNATIONAL COURT 
EXERCISING CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER TERRORISM 
The Netherlands’ proposal draws attention to two situations in 
which an international court with criminal jurisdiction over terrorism 
would be particularly helpful to suppressing terrorist acts. Both 
situations involve a failure of a state to exercise its basic criminal 
police powers: (a) the state is simply unable to do so by virtue of 
collapsed infrastructure or failure to control its territory, or (b) the 
state is unwilling to assist in the prosecution of terrorists, perhaps 
because the state empathizes with the particular terrorist cause.82 This 
article evaluates both situations and also considers other ancillary 
reasons for referring terrorists to an international court. 
1. States that are Unable to Bring Terrorists to Justice 
Some states simply lack the ability to bring terrorists in their 
territorial jurisdiction (or any other form of jurisdiction) to justice. 
The list of “unable” states may include not only failed states, like 
 
 81. Cf. Silvia A. Fernández de Gurmendi, The Working Group on Aggression 
at the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 589, 597-98 (2002) (acknowledging discussion regarding the magnitude 
or gravity of the use of force under the definition of aggression). 
 82. A historical example would be the Lockerbie bombing case, in which 
Libyan nationals were accused of setting bombs that killed hundreds, including a 
number of Scottish nationals. Libya, at first, refused to turn over the suspects and 
claimed that Libya could try the bombers itself. The international community took 
the belief that Libya has no intention to earnestly try the suspects. See JOHN P. 
GRANT, THE LOCKERBIE TRIAL: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY xvii-liii (2004). 
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Somalia,83 but those that have lost a monopoly over the legitimate 
use of force in a portion of their territory but are otherwise 
functional, such as Colombia or Pakistan.84 In both cases, the state 
simply cannot capture and prosecute terrorists effectively. Stronger 
states typically provide military support to these governments, which 
is needed to reach territory the central state cannot control and give 
logistical support to weak criminal justice systems.85 In some cases, 
“unable” states even find unconventional means of bringing terrorists 
to justice—the United States sometimes acquires terrorists in these 
states by extraordinary rendition, a practice which is roundly 
unpopular in the rest of the world,86 or, for example, uses unmanned 
drones to fly over uncontrolled Pakistan and strike terrorist leaders.87  
Notwithstanding these mechanisms used by the community of 
nations to combat terrorists hiding out in weak states, there does 
seem to be an advantage to creating a neutral, international court 
with jurisdiction to try such terrorists. The obvious problem with 
referring prosecution of these elusive terrorists to an international 
court is, however, a reiteration of the state’s inability to try them in 
the first place: any international court may issue an arrest warrant, 
but there may be no competent military or law enforcement body to 
 
 83. See Walter S. Clarke & Robert Gosende, Somalia: Can a Collapsed State 
Reconstitute Itself?, in STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF 
TERROR 129, 129-30 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2003) (“Somalia is considered by 
some to be a likely refuge for terrorists in the post 11 September world.”). 
 84. See C. CHRISTINE FAIR & PETER CHALK, FORTIFYING PAKISTAN: THE ROLE 
OF U.S. INTERNAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE 9 (2006) (noting the array of challenges 
confronting law enforcement and intelligence personnel in Pakistan, including 
jihadist terrorism, sectarian extremism, and drug trafficking); Harvey F. Kline, 
Colombia: Lawlessness, Drug Trafficking, and Carving Up the State, in STATE 
FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR supra note 83, at 161, 161 
(chronicling the historically weak Columbian government—particularly its 
inability to govern rural areas of the country). 
 85. FAIR & CHALK, supra note 84, at 50-52 (describing the U.S. Dept. of 
Justice security assistance to Pakistan, including police officer training and 
assistance with investigative capacities). 
 86. See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary 
Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1333 (2007) (urging 
that extraordinary rendition, though “a practice purportedly developed to uphold 
the rule of law against lawless terrorists,” has itself become “a lawless practice 
which perverts the rule of law”). 
 87. E.g., Bobby Gosh & Mark Thompson, The CIA's Silent War in Pakistan, 
TIME (Jun. 1, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1900248 
,00.html. 
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undertake the dangerous task of finding and apprehending these 
suspects in lawless areas.88 Insofar as U.N.-blessed military forces 
from other states may attempt to perform this function, remember 
that the United States and other countries with strong militaries 
already attempt to render this kind of assistance. Nonetheless, the 
approval of the international system could assist in such missions. 
Additionally, states that can control their territory but have weak 
investigative or criminal adjudication systems would seem to benefit 
the most from referring to an international court the complex and 
expensive task of investigating and prosecuting a massive terrorist 
attack. Weaker states could be infused with trained judges and other 
legal staff as well as financial support to build a more legitimate 
infrastructure. There would of course be drawbacks, such as a loss of 
local involvement and local justice in these cases, but there may be a 
way to ameliorate such concerns—explored later in this article. 
2. States that are Unwilling to Bring Terrorists to Justice 
There exist competent and organized states that simply do not 
wish to surrender terrorists in their territory to another state which 
has a grievance against them. For example, in the famous Lockerbie 
bombing case, the government of Libya had custody over the two 
persons accused of planting a bomb on a plane that killed 270 people 
when it exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland.89 Libya insisted that it 
would try the suspects, who were both Libyan citizens.90 The 
international community suspected that the pending Libyan 
prosecution would surely be a sham.91 After lengthy negotiation and 
litigation before the International Court of Justice, the two suspects 
in the bombing were surrendered to a special court in the 
Netherlands to be tried under Scottish national law.92  
 
 88. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 58 (“At any time after the 
initiation of an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the application of the 
Prosecutor, issue a warrant of arrest of a person . . .”), with Associated Press, 
Sudan leader re-elected despite war crimes charges, USA TODAY, Apr. 26, 2010, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-04-26-Sudan_N.htm. 
 89. See GRANT, supra note 82, at xvii-xviii. 
 90. Id. at xix. 
 91. Id. at xvii. 
 92. Id. at xix-xx, xxii-xxiii, 135-43 (doc. 2.11) (reproducing the Libyan 
Position paper accepting the special court); id. at 149-62 (doc. 2.14) (setting an 
agreement for the special court between Scotland and the Netherlands). 
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It is not just rogue states like late 20th century Libya that are 
unwilling to surrender suspected terrorists to nations seeking to try 
them. Many bilateral extradition treaties contain “political offense” 
exceptions that do not allow those suspected of political crimes to be 
extradited.93 While extradition treaties have been adapted in the 
modern era to facilitate the transfer of terrorists,94 there is still a great 
deal of disagreement between states about who should be considered 
a terrorist and who a political offender. Freedom fighters and those 
who have advocated but not actually participated in violence pose 
particular problems. In general, states may fear that counterterrorism 
extradition requests are mere facades for the persecution of political 
rivals. By the same token, political sympathy can be a culprit when 
states refuse to allow extradition. For example, judges in the United 
States—where there is a large and sympathetic Irish American 
community—were often unwilling to extradite members of the Irish 
Republican Army, even to the United Kingdom, the United States’ 
closest ally and a state where the guarantees of a fair trial are as sure 
 
 93. See Antje C. Petersen, Note, Extradition and the Political Offense 
Exception in the Suppression of Terrorism, 67 IND. L.J. 767, 777 (1992) 
(lamenting the devaluing effect of political offender exceptions on extradition 
treaties); see also In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1981) (agreeing with 
the Magistrate Judge that an Irish Republican Army member charged with 
murdering a British soldier was properly granted political offender status). 
 94. See, e.g., Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty with the 
United Kingdom, U.S.-U.K., June 25, 1985, S. EXEC. DOC. 99-17 (1986) 
(modifying the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-
U.K., June 8, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 227). Article 1 of the Supplementary Treaty reads: 
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following shall be regarded as 
an offense of a political character: 
(a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have the obligation pursuant to a 
multilateral international agreement to extradite the person sought or to submit his case 
to their competent authorities for decision as to prosecution; 
(b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily harm; 
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including taking a hostage; 
(d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or parcel 
bomb, or any incendiary device if this use endangers any person; 
(e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or participation as an 
accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offense. 
Id. app. 1, art. 1. New extradition treaties are now written with language similar to 
the Supplementary Treaty, denying political offense protection to international 
terrorists. 
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as anywhere.95 
If a request for extradition of a suspected terrorist were to come 
from an international court rather than another country, the request 
might have more persuasive appeal over the state with custody of the 
suspect. Of course, for this to be true, the international court would 
have to be careful to maintain legitimacy and not involve itself in 
politically-motivated prosecutions.96 Arguably, an international court 
would still run into some of the same issues as a bilateral extradition 
regime: like the Lockerbie case, a country that is reticent to give up 
its nationals could institute a sham prosecution to keep them, since 
any international criminal court would most likely not be ratified 
unless it had a complementarity regime like that of the ICC.97 
However, the moral authority of an international court has an 
undeniable appeal because of its perceived unbiased nature and 
ability to assign universal moral condemnation to perpetrators. Such 
a court would likely have more success pressuring reticent countries 
to surrender accused terrorists, at least compared to states acting on 
their own. 
3. Other Arguments 
The Netherlands’ proposal suggests that the chief practical reason 
for expanding the ICC’s jurisdiction to include terrorism is the 
problem of states that are unable or unwilling to prosecute suspected 
terrorists. There are, however, a few other considerations that might 
weigh in favor of trying terrorist crimes before an international body.  
The first argument is a moral one, as noted previously. Trying 
terrorism at an international level would show that the international 
community stands united against terrorism, and would add credibility 
to worldwide condemnation of terrorist acts. In this way, 
 
 95. E.g., In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122; In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES FOR 2007: UNITED KINGDOM 1760 (2008) ("The Government generally 
respected the human rights of its citizens."). 
 96. See, e.g., Marc Grossman, U.S. State Department Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs, Remarks to Center for Strategic and International Studies (May 6, 
2002), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Grossman.pdf (highlighting the 
United States’ opposition to the ICC and specifically identifying the fear of 
politically-motivated prosecutions as a reason for that opposition). 
 97. For the terms of the ICC’s complementarity regime, see Rome Statute, 
supra note 1, arts. 17-20. 
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international trials for terrorists also further the goal of norm 
creation; international involvement in criminal suppression of 
terrorism creates fewer ideological refuges for terrorists and disrupts 
their ability to appeal to moderate and other non-radical 
constituencies.98 Additionally, any increase in effective enforcement 
of existing bans on terrorism can also serve a deterrent purpose, 
though it is unclear how effective the ICC has been at deterring those 
leaders who are bold enough to commit international crimes in the 
first place.99 
National-international cooperative courts may have added benefits 
because they allow international actors, working side-by-side with 
officials in weaker states, to instill notions of human rights, justice 
and fair process, governmental accountability, strong 
institutionalization of criminal justice processes, and international 
cooperation.100 This cooperation builds capacity in weaker states 
instead of simply taking over the role of law enforcement from them. 
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN INTERNATIONAL COURT EXERCISING 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER TERRORISM 
The main arguments against referring criminal trial of terrorists to 
an international body revolve around the sovereignty of states. 
 1. States are Generally Effective at Criminally Trying Terrorists  
As noted above, transnational crime is different than international 
crime in that international crime often cannot be judicially 
suppressed by states. Terrorism, on the other hand, is routinely and 
 
 98. See Vigay M. Padmanabhan, Norm Internalization Through Trials For 
Violations of International Law: Four Conditions for Success and Their 
Application to Trials of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 427, 
429-31 (2009) (arguing that trials for the violation of international laws can 
internalize those laws within communities which otherwise lack respect for them). 
 99. See James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the 
Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 
(2009) (quoting recent Under Secretary of State John Bolton—“[a] weak and 
distant [International Criminal] Court will have no deterrent effect on the hard men 
like Pol Pot most likely to commit crimes against humanity . . .”—and noting 
further that measuring the deterrent effect of any criminal policy “can be 
extraordinarily difficult”). 
 100. Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 
306-08 (2003). 
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effectively dealt with by state criminal justice systems.101 Although 
some states possess meager law enforcement capabilities buttressed 
by frail court systems, their lack of efficacy is typically overcome by 
mutual legal assistance rather than through the loss of local control 
over prosecution.102 While some states have struggled to adapt to the 
threat of terrorism, we are seeing national jurisdictions adopt new 
and innovative procedures to meet this challenge, including—inter 
alia—criminal courts of special jurisdiction,103 procedures for 
handling classified evidence or new police tactics to further the 
effective investigation of crimes,104 and special terrorism laws for 
trial and appeal.105 Many states simply have no need to refer terrorist 
prosecutions to an international court. 
 
 101. See, e.g., JAMES BECKMAN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES TO 
HOMELAND SECURITY AND ANTI-TERRORISM 51, 89, 113, 125, 137, 145 (2007) 
(identifying the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Russia, Japan, and Israel as 
examples of states who have had ongoing terrorist activity and have effectively 
dealt with the offenders through trials or legislation). 
 102. See LORNA HARRIS & CHRISTOPHER MURRAY, MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN 
CRIMINAL MATTERS: INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE INVESTIGATION AND 
PROSECUTION OF CRIME 2-4 (2000) (commenting on recent increases in reciprocal 
criminal legal assistance between states, concomitant with the rise of international 
trade and travel and the growing threat of transnational crime). But cf. ETHAN A. 
NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. 
CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 4-7 (1993) (referencing the U.S.’s tendency to 
compensate for weak criminal justice systems in other states by internationalizing 
its own law enforcement). 
 103. See, e.g., AUDENCIA NACIONAL, http://www.audiencianacional.es (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2011) (sitting in Madrid with jurisdiction over international crimes, 
including terrorism); Schools: About the Courts, IRELAND CTS. SERVICE, 
http://www.courts.ie/Courts.ie/library3.nsf/pagecurrent/10646F81427562D480256
DA9004139B7?opendocument (last visited Jan. 1, 2011) (“The Special Criminal 
Court [of Ireland] consists of three judges sitting without a jury and mostly deals 
with criminal charges involving terrorist organisations, and more recently, charges 
relating to organised drug activities.”). 
 104. See generally BECKMAN, supra note 101, at 43, 71, 110, 116, 140 
(providing numerous examples of unique approaches taken by different states for 
the investigation of terrorist crimes); U.N. LEGISLATIVE SERIES, NATIONAL LAWS 
AND REGULATIONS ON THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM, at 171-76, 263-65, 372-73, 494-500, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/22, 
U.N. Sales No. E/F.02.V.7 (2002) (surveying airport security laws of Fiji and New 
Zealand). 
 105. See THE FEDERAL COURT OF JUSTICE 9-10 (2008), available at 
http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/758306/publicationFile/9
1260/brochure.pdf (explaining the German Court’s jurisdiction over appeals in 
terrorism cases). 
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2. States Do Not Wish to Lose Control over National Prosecution 
Not only do many states have no need to refer terrorists to an 
international body, many have no desire to do so either. States often 
do not want to lose the ability to directly punish the terrorists who 
have targeted them, and accordingly, have given careful thought to 
their national counterterrorism laws and wish to see them applied. 
Community justice for a harm done to that community is a valuable 
process—states who effectively prosecute “their” terrorists do not 
wish to see them disappear to The Hague when the suspects could be 
tried publically at home, victims’ families could be present in the 
courtroom during the hearing, and communities could see the 
perpetrators incarcerated in a local prison.106 
Additionally, states are wary of the definition and application of 
the label of terrorism and do not wish to see those that they do not 
consider terrorists the subject of foreign extradition requests. For 
example, many states consider terrorist-supporting speech to be an 
act of terrorism,107 but a country such as the United States would be 
hesitant to extradite someone to face trial for political speech.108 
Countries with large militaries, intelligence forces, or militias may be 
concerned that their armed forces or government officials would be 
accused of terrorism.109 Indeed, the United States has promulgated 
the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act110 to emphatically 
declare that members of the American armed forces are never to be 
sent before the ICC and tried for any crime, even if they fall within 
the court’s territorial jurisdiction.111 This policy highlights state 
 
 106. See Steven A. Engel, The Public’s Vicinage Right: A Constitutional 
Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658, 1661 (2000) (emphasizing the importance of 
community participation in criminal trials). 
 107. See, e.g., BECKMAN, supra note 101, at 147 (citing Israel’s Prevention of 
Terrorism Ordinance, which prohibits “terrorist speech”). 
 108. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
 109. See SOLERA, supra note 64, at 351 (reproducing one proposal for the 
definition of the crime of aggression where liability could be broadly assigned to 
commanders and even politicians who direct their subordinates to use armed 
violence to violate the “sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence 
of [another] State”). 
 110. American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-
7433 (2006). 
 111. Id. § 7426(c) (repealed 2008) (“ARTICLE 98 WAIVER- The President 
may, without prior notice to Congress, waive the prohibition of [the subsection 
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concerns about the definition of the crime of aggression, namely the 
potential for legitimate state actions such as self-determination, 
anticipatory self-defense, or humanitarian intervention to violate its 
technical definition.112 States do not want their nationals to be 
punished for a technical violation when their actions nonetheless 
comport with what the state considers to be the spirit of the 
international criminal law. This fear of misapplication was a 
recurring one for states while negotiating the definition of the crime 
of aggression. 
There is often even more concern related to national control of 
internal matters. For example, the United States and India maintain 
the right to hold suspected terrorists in preventative detention 
without trial.113 If the ICC were to issue arrest warrants for such 
persons, the complementarity regime would not protect the state’s 
ability to hold them without charge.114  
3. Most Transnational Crimes are more Domestic than International 
in Nature 
International crimes tend to be directed against the international 
system itself. If a state engages in an act of aggression against 
another, or if the leadership of a state instigates, encourages, or fails 
to suppress a massive genocide in a neighboring state, these crimes 
tend to be not only geographically international, but directed against 
the community of nations itself; they, thus, have the effect of 
undermining the stability of that community.115 Terrorist actions, by 
 
allowing no military assistance to a party to the Rome Statute] with respect to a 
particular country if he determines and reports to the appropriate congressional 
committees that such country has entered into an agreement with the United States 
pursuant to Article 98 of the Rome Statute preventing the International Criminal 
court from proceeding against United States personnel present in such country.”). 
 112. SOLERA, supra note 64, at 415-16 ; see Murphy, supra note 70, at 345 
(stating that unauthorized humanitarian intervention is generally viewed as 
unlawful). 
 113. Arunabha Bhoumik, Democratic Responses to Terrorism: A Comparative 
Study of the United States, Israel, and India, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 285, 
318, 334 (2005). 
 114. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17, ¶ 1(a) (providing complementarity 
protection for investigation or prosecution, not preventative detention). 
 115. See André Nollkaemper, Systemic Effects of International Responsibility 
for International Crimes, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 313, 315-22 (2010) 
(providing examples of “system criminality,” including the dirty war in Argentina 
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contrast, while they are certainly a threat to peace and security, are 
often directed against a single state’s policies (e.g., protest over 
United States presence in the Middle East).116 A terrorist act can be 
committed by nationals, lawful residents, dual nationals, or lawfully 
visiting foreign nationals and it can occur within the territory of the 
state, against the state’s nationals, with the goal of influencing the 
government of that state, or based on an international movement or 
ideology.117 Terrorist acts can also be committed by a single, private 
individual. These transnational criminal characteristics pragmatically 
separate terrorism from international crimes.  
For these reasons—and unlike genocide or aggression or crimes 
against humanity, which are necessarily broad in scale, or war 
crimes, which require an extraordinary scale of interstate or intrastate 
violence as a prerequisite—most of the world’s terrorism crimes can, 
and often must, be tried nationally. There will be only a few cases of 
the scale and international nature for which it may be helpful to refer 
investigation and trial to an international court.118 
4. Terrorism Crimes Could Overload an International Court of 
General Jurisdiction 
Unlike those crimes over which the ICC currently has jurisdiction, 
terrorism crimes often target or harm only a small number of people. 
 
in the 1970s and 1980s and the crimes committed during the armed conflicts in 
Sudan, where states and organized armed groups actively encourage the 
commission of international crimes by even “unexceptional” people). 
 116. See John Alan Cohan, Necessity, Political Violence and Terrorism, 35 
STETSON L. REV. 903, 915 (2006) (suggesting that one possible justification for 
terrorist actions is to “thwart perceived inequity, tyranny, or injustice” caused by 
the West). 
 117. While many scholars differentiate between international and domestic 
terrorism, this article recommends against strict delineation between the two. Even 
if a terrorist action is directed against a state by its own nationals, there are 
exceedingly few cases in which international movements or policies are not 
implicated. Additionally, wide-scale terrorist violence in a single country is still a 
threat to the peace and security of the international community. See SAUL, supra 
note 22, at 47 (showing that the U.N. Security Council condemns “all forms” of 
terrorism, domestic or international). 
 118. Cf., Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1220-21 (2002) (providing examples of truly international 
terrorism, such as the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania, and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in the United 
States). 
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Using the ICC as an example, the court could become completely 
overwhelmed by the volume of small terrorist crimes occurring 
throughout the world. A surge in caseload might distract ICC staff 
from other crimes, and the court might struggle institutionally to 
continue to deter and suppress grave international crimes occurring 
at the interstate level. 
C. DESIGNING AN INTERNATIONAL COURT TO ADDRESS THE 
ARGUMENTS ABOVE 
If judicial economy were no object, and we could start with a 
blank slate to design an international court tailored to the 
adjudication of terrorist crimes—incorporating the positives noted 
above and minimizing the negatives—what would that court look 
like?  
This article posits that states have a greater role in suppressing 
terrorism and other transnational crimes than they do in deterring and 
punishing acts in violation of traditional international criminal law, 
where the mechanisms of state suppression have typically failed. 
National courts are normally effective at investigating and trying 
most terrorists within their jurisdiction. In fact, because most acts of 
terrorism are perpetrated domestically, the number of smaller acts of 
terrorism to be tried in an international forum would be limited. 
Finally, the fact that the international community cannot reach a 
consensus on a definition of terrorism also supports the role of states 
in suppressing terrorism.  
However, in those cases where the state or states with jurisdiction 
are genuinely unable or unwilling to prosecute suspected terrorists, 
there may well be a role for an international court that will uphold 
national participation in the proceedings and take account of the 
concerns of states. Such a court could assist in norm creation, 
effective enforcement, legitimizing counterterrorism operations, and 
possibly deterrence. Thus, this article suggests the creation of a 
permanent international hybrid court—one that would apply national 
law but use international criminal justice norms and administrators. 
Such a court could provide weaker states with international support 
and build capacity while giving them a role in achieving communal 
justice. Furthermore, it could help morally undermine unwilling 
states that express sympathy for the terrorists they harbor, while 
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avoiding conflicts with the sovereign and effective criminal justice 
operations of other states. 
1. Features of a Permanent Hybrid Court Exercising Jurisdiction 
over Terrorism: The Special Court for Counterterrorism 
The international system is familiar with the work of hybrid 
courts; hybrid courts have existed in Sierra Leone to try grave 
violations of humanitarian law (the Special Court for Sierra Leone)119 
and in Cambodia to try offensives of the Khmer Rouge 
(Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia).120 Similar 
smaller courts have existed in Kosovo, East Timor, Nigeria, Peru, 
and other states.121 There is even the recently established Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, a hybrid court applying Lebanese national 
law, charged with investigating and trying all those connected with 
the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, a criminal 
act which was technically—under the definitions discussed above—
an act of terrorism.122  
While the ICC has struggled in its short year history to effectively 
prosecute or build a strong institutional reputation, contemporaneous 
hybrid tribunals have been fairly successful.123 Hybrid tribunals 
 
 119. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra 
Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1, Jan. 16, 
2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Statute of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone] (establishing a court “to prosecute persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra 
Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 
1996”). 
 120. See Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes 
Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 1, June 6, 2003, 2329 
U.N.T.S. 117 (setting forth the purpose of the court, which is “bringing to trial the 
senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for 
the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international 
humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by 
Cambodia . . .”). 
 121. See Dickinson, supra note 100, at 295 (focusing in particular on the 
international tribunals in Kosovo and East Timor, each of which worked to bolster 
local judiciary infrastructure and personnel). 
 122. See S.C. Res. 1757, supra note 50, Annex (characterizing the attack on 
Prime Minister Hariri as a “terrorist crime”). 
 123. See, e.g., Dickenson, supra note 100, at 297-300 (citing three examples 
where hybrid courts were established because neither domestic courts nor 
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provide an effective means of conveying much needed international 
assistance in extraordinary situations while still allowing for the 
application of national law.124 National prosecutors and personnel 
play a role in the trials, and, to a certain extent, the country controls 
whom the court indicts.125 Just as the Lebanese government struck a 
balance between international and domestic involvement when it 
sought to create the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,126 this model for 
cooperative enterprise could be applied to a number of other acts of 
extraordinary terrorism.  
If individual hybrid courts are so effective, the question becomes: 
why does the international system need a permanent one? The 
answer is that a permanent court would mitigate time and money 
expenditures involved in perpetually establishing new courts with 
similar features. While the international community will likely 
continue to establish new temporary hybrid courts because ICC 
prosecution of transnational crime is ineffective and—as this article 
posits—inappropriate, a single court would have economy, 
legitimacy, more deterrent value, consistent personnel, resources, 
and guiding law. Generally speaking, a permanent court would 
prevent the international community from needing to reinvent the 
wheel each time a qualifying transnational crime is committed. The 
international system originally created the ICC to avoid the “tribunal 
fatigue” it faced when establishing new courts for international 
criminal law violations.127 The repetitive creation of new hybrid 
tribunals for the prosecution of transnational crime could also lead to 
 
international tribunals could effectively handle their case backlog). 
 124. See id. at 297, 300 (noting that the Hybrid Courts in Kosovo, East Timor, 
and Sierra Leone allowed both foreign and domestic lawyers to participate in the 
proceedings). 
 125. See id. at 297-300. 
 126. See THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HARIRI TRIBUNAL 50-51 (C. Tofan ed., 
2008) (reprinting relevant U.N. documents, including a report from U.N. 
Commission recommending a “sustained effort on the part of the international 
community to establish an assistance and cooperation platform together with the 
Lebanese authorities”). 
 127. See John P. Cerone, Dynamic Equilibrium: The Evolution of US Attitudes 
Toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 277, 290 
(2007) (citing David J. Scheffer, Address at New England School of Law: 
Challenges Confronting International Justice Issues (Jan. 14, 1998)). Cerone points 
out that the United States, a current non-party to the Rome Statute, was actually a 
major impetus behind its creation. Id. 
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such fatigue. 
Some may claim that a permanent hybrid court, such as the one 
outlined below, would be a new treaty court and, thus, require the 
arduous process of building consensus and attracting signatures. It is 
true that this institutional cost is unavoidable. Nonetheless, 
establishing a permanent hybrid court would preempt the future need 
to establish multiple courts, which each require a similarly difficult 
approval process. Detractors may also argue that it will be difficult to 
attract states that are unwilling to turn over alleged terrorists. But, it 
is worth noting that these same “unwilling states” can just as easily 
opt out of the crime of terrorism if it is added to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, as long as they are parties to the Rome Statute at the 
time of its addition.128  
It would be a novel undertaking for the international system to 
create a permanent hybrid tribunal. The ICC was created to take over 
the kind of work done by international tribunals in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda—non-hybrid courts prosecuting only 
international crimes. Along the same lines, a permanent hybrid could 
be established to parallel the work of the ICC, addressing 
transnational crime rather than international crime. This court could 
have jurisdiction over numerous kinds of transnational crime (an 
argument addressed in the next subsection), or, the court could be 
limited to terrorism crimes alone. Henceforth this article will use the 
working moniker the “Special Court for Counterterrorism” (“SCC”). 
The challenge for the SCC would be that hybrid tribunals typically 
apply national law alongside international law. Both the ICTY and 
ICTR, and the ICC that followed, applied roughly the same 
formulation of international law.129 A hybrid tribunal that hears cases 
from more than one national jurisdiction would have to apply 
different bodies of law in different cases. This challenge is not as 
daunting as it first appears. An addendum to this paper includes a 
Draft Statute for the Special Court for Counterterrorism, which 
provides a list of procedures for handling this and other issues. The 
 
 128. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121, ¶ 5; see supra note 77. 
 129. See, e.g., Dr. Göran Sluiter, The Surrender of War Criminals to the 
International Criminal Court, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 605, 611-12 
(2003) (explaining the hierarchical relationship between states and the ICC, ICTY, 
and ICTR). 
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following subsections summarize and explain of a few basic features 
for the proposed SCC. 
a. Judges130 
There shall be a permanent cadre of international judges serving a 
term of years decided by the states parties. The appended draft 
statute proposes five-year terms. National judges, comprising a 
minority of the number of judges in the Pre-Trial, Trial, and Appeals 
Chambers, shall be appointed ad hoc when cases are referred from 
their nation and shall be appointed by their states of nationality. 
There should be one Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber, and Appeals 
Chamber for each state with current cases before the court. 
b. Prosecutor131 
The SCC will have one Prosecutor appointed for a term of years 
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In hybrid tribunals, 
there is typically a deputy prosecutor of the nationality of the state 
that the United Nations is assisting. In the SCC, there will be 
multiple deputy prosecutors, one for each state which is currently 
pursuing cases before the court. They will each carry a title of 
nationality: Deputy Prosecutor for Somalia, Deputy Prosecutor for 
Spain, etc. Such deputy prosecutors will be appointed by their states 
of nationality. 
c. Defense Office132 
While not all hybrid tribunals employ permanent defense staff, this 
article recommends the establishment of a Defense Office because of 
the political unpopularity and varying economic status of terrorist 
suspects. This Office would assure apt representation and procedural 
fairness that will ultimately bolster rule of law norms. 
 
 130. See Draft Statute of the Special Court for Counterterrorism [hereinafter 
Draft Statute], infra app., arts. 18-20. 
 131. See Draft Statute, infra app., arts. 18, 22. 
 132. See Draft Statute, infra app., arts. 18, 24. 
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d. Substantive Law133 
The substantive law of the SCC will consist of both international 
and national criminal proscriptions on terrorism. If at some point in 
the future a single unifying definition of terrorism is adopted, 
whether it establishes its pedigree as an international crime or not, 
the statute can be amended to include it. Until that time, this article 
recommends that international legal proscriptions on terrorism be 
imported from the thirteen sectoral treaties that decry specific 
terrorist acts, such as aircraft hijacking and hostage-taking.134 
National legal proscriptions shall be included by agreement between 
the government of the prosecuting state and the United Nations.135 
This process appears complex, but will streamline access to hybrid 
prosecution compared to the repetitive creation of new tribunals.136 
e. Jurisdiction 
The procedure by which the SCC will come to exercise its 
 
 133. See Draft Statute, infra app., arts. 5-7. 
 134. See Draft Statute, infra app., art. 6; see also Convention on Offences and 
Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941; 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, December 16, 
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564; Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975; International Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. 11081; Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1980, T.I.A.S. 11080; Protocol for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International 
Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474; 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201; Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental 
Shelf , Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201; Convention on the Marking of Plastic 
Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1991, 2122 
U.N.T.S. 359; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256; International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13075; International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Apr. 13, 2005, 2445 
U.N.T.S. 89. 
 135. See Draft Statute, infra app., arts. 7-8. 
 136. See, e.g., GRANT, supra note 82, at xxix (explaining the lengthy process 
undertaken to establish a national Scottish tribunal sitting in the Netherlands to try 
the two suspected Lockerbie bombers). 
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jurisdiction is the most delicate feature of the new court. Such a court 
brings the specter of politically motivated referrals, and there must 
be a careful mechanism for selecting which referrals to pursue. For 
example, special procedures for granting jurisdiction were 
considered for the crime of aggression within the ICC because states 
are concerned that they may be referred to the court even when they 
consider themselves to have acted legally.137 
Referrals will be pursued in one of two ways. First, a state—
particularly a weaker state with territorial, national, or passive 
personality jurisdiction over the offenders—can institute a request 
for assistance.138 The alleged terrorism crimes must fit one or more of 
the offenses described in the thirteen sectoral treaties, national law 
proscriptions on terrorism, or both.139 The state will reach agreement 
with the President of the Special Court about which national laws 
should be applied, and will appoint a Deputy Prosecutor and ad hoc 
judges to its own newly constituted national chamber.140 
State referral by an affected state, rather than independent 
indictment by the Prosecutor, would preserve state sovereignty in a 
number of important ways. First, any definitions of terrorism adopted 
by the SCC will not result in automatic prosecution; a state must first 
pursue referral. States will not have to be concerned, as they are with 
aggression under the ICC, that benign or marginally criminal acts 
will come within one of the technical definitions and therefore 
trigger indictment by an ambitious prosecutor.141 Second, states will 
have the opportunity to evaluate for themselves whether it is 
preferable to prosecute a particular crime with international 
 
 137. See Report of the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Annex II, ¶¶ 
5-6, RC/20 (June 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ 
ASP/ReviewConference/Crime+of+Aggression.htm (noting disagreement over 
whether jurisdiction should be asserted where the alleged aggressor state has not 
accepted jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, and referencing different 
opinions as to how the court should proceed when the Security Council has yet to 
determine that an act of aggression has occurred). 
 138. See Draft Statute, infra app., art. 10. 
 139. See Draft Statute, infra app., arts. 5, 9. 
 140. See Draft Statute, infra app., art. 7. 
 141. See Robert A. Alter, International Criminal Law: A Bittersweet Year for 
Supporters and Critics of the International Criminal Court, 37 INT’L LAW. 541, 
544 (2003) (summarizing U.S. fears, applicable even to established ICC crimes, 
that extensive prosecutorial discretion “opens the door to politically motivated 
prosecutions”). 
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cooperation rather than through an entirely domestic proceeding. The 
SCC would also guard against politically motivated referrals. If a 
state party chooses to refer a politically motivated case to the SCC, 
they have now imposed a neutral body which is free to acquit the 
defendants—or even drop the charges.  
The second way that a referral could be received is through the 
Security Council.142 This is the basis for the international 
community’s authority to establish the ICTY and ICTR,143 and it can 
also be the means for compelling states—that do not voluntarily 
prosecute or refer cases—to turn terrorism suspects over to the SCC. 
For a case in which an unwilling state with custody or bases of 
jurisdiction refuses to prosecute a terrorist act, the Security Council 
can declare that this failure to prosecute constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security and refer the case to the Prosecutor 
of the SCC for compulsory investigation. The prosecutor can then 
initiate an investigation and determine whether there are chargeable 
crimes.  
Security Council referral could have been used to resolve the 
Lockerbie bomber case. Though the Libyan government in the 
Lockerbie case actually held out in the face of numerous U.N. 
resolutions pressuring them to turn over the suspects, Libya 
eventually agreed to a trial by a special panel in the Netherlands.144 
Turning suspects over to an international panel presents a certain 
added appeal by way of legitimacy, and creates political pressure that 
the international community can bring to bear to resolve such cases. 
For state referrals, the statute relies on passive personality 
jurisdiction along with the two more traditional bases of jurisdiction 
included in Rome Statute—nationality of the offender and territory 
in which the crime was committed.145 The crime of terrorism is one 
 
 142. See Draft Statute, infra app., art. 11, ¶ 1. 
 143. E.g., VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 37 (1995). 
 144. See Donna E. Arzt, The Lockerbie “Extradition by Analogy” Agreement: 
“Exceptional Measure” or Template for Transnational Criminal Justice?, 18 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 163, 167-68 (2002) (stating that this was the first time the U.N. 
Security Council had “pressured a state, through economic sanctions, to surrender 
its nationals for trial abroad”). 
 145. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 402 (1987) (granting a state jurisdiction over certain conduct and 
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which lends itself to passive personality jurisdiction.146 In order to 
ensure prosecution when the states qualifying for jurisdiction under 
the more traditional bases are unwilling or unable to accomplish it, 
states whose nationals are targeted should have the ability to assert 
SCC jurisdiction over the offenders. The appended Draft Statute 
limits passive personality jurisdiction to situations where it can be 
shown, prima facie, that alleged offenders intended and actually 
succeeded in harming nationals of the state asserting such 
jurisdiction.  
Even though states will be able to assert passive personality 
jurisdiction over nationals of other states parties, the structure of the 
permanent hybrid court does not allow for infringement on the 
independence of other states. The proposed complementarity regime 
protects states that diligently prosecute their nationals for committing 
a terrorist offense against nationals of another state.147 Furthermore, 
there is an additional conflict procedure for states who do not avail 
themselves of the complementarity regime or whose prosecutions are 
not found to be genuine by the SCC—these states may request 
additional ad hoc judges of their nationality be appointed to the Trial 
and Appeals Chambers to protect the interests of their nation.148 
These mechanisms and others, by encouraging states to ratify the 
statute and accede to this possible loss of jurisdiction over their 
nationals, put significant normative pressure on states that may be 
“holdouts” in their opposition to anti-terrorism norms. Hopefully, by 
encouraging participation, holdout states can be brought into the fold 
of states cooperating to suppress international terrorism. 
 
persons in its territory, conduct intended to have substantial effect within its 
territory, its own nationals, and certain other conduct by foreign nationals outside 
its territory that is directed against its national security or a limited class of other 
state interests), with Draft Statute, infra app., art. 8 (extending jurisdiction of the 
court to cases where a State Party is either: the State in which the conduct in 
question occurred, the State of which the accused is a national, or the State in 
which the victims or intended victims are nationals). 
 146. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 402 cmt. g (1987) (applying the passive personality principle to 
terrorists). 
 147. See Draft Statute, infra app., art. 16, ¶ 3; see also Rome Statute, supra note 
1, art. 17, ¶ 1. A complementarity regime means that cases are inadmissible at the 
supranational level as long as the case is being diligently investigated or 
prosecuted at the national level. 
 148. See Draft Statute, infra app., art. 10(3). 
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f. Multiple States Implicated by a Single Event  
In the event that a terrorism crime targets and successfully harms 
nationals or national interests of multiple states, the appended statute 
provides that the President of the SCC shall first request that the 
interested states consider which state is the most affected by the 
terrorist event, and that they defer prosecutorial authority to that 
party, or otherwise negotiate a division of responsibilities.149 In the 
event that an agreement cannot be reached, the President of the 
Special Court will have equitable powers to divide prosecution 
responsibilities, to decide on the allotment of judges and Deputy 
Prosecutors, and to append multiple national laws (keeping in mind 
the general principles of international law and any double jeopardy 
considerations that might thereby arise), as he or she deems 
appropriate.150 
g. Location 
The appended Draft Statute provides that the SCC be 
headquartered in The Hague, but also allows the court to sit 
elsewhere if desirable.151 While The Hague would be the best 
location to ensure the involvement of international lawyers, one can 
imagine that for the most significant terrorist events, local chambers 
can be convened to work side-by-side with national prosecutors. The 
statute also proposes flexibility on working languages to meet the 
demands of operating among so many nations.152 
h. Comparison to Existing Courts 
The Draft Statute derives its provisions from a variety of existing 
statutes, including the Rome Statute, the Statute for the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, and the Statute for the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon.153 Of course, the draft puts forth only one version of many 
possible versions that could be created. This article purposefully 
included a shorter statute more common to the hybrid courts, as 
 
 149. Draft Statute, infra app., art. 11, ¶ 5. 
 150. Draft Statute, infra app., art. 11, ¶ 5. 
 151. Draft Statute, infra app., art. 3, ¶¶ 1, 3. 
 152. See Draft Statute, infra app., art. 25. 
 153. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 1; Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, supra note 119; S.C. Res. 1757, supra note 50. 
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opposed to the longer Rome Statute. Where the Rome Statute might 
have multiple articles on command responsibility and the irrelevance 
of official capacity, these provisions were consolidated into the 
shorter formulation of “individual criminal responsibility” that one 
would find in most hybrid tribunals’ statutes.154 This shorter version 
makes it easier to understand the recommended procedures; 
however, in creating a permanent court, the international community 
may prefer to give it less flexibility and state procedures more 
clearly. The proposed SCC statute also imports typical features of a 
“treaty-made” court—like the ICC, including provisions for 
amendment and withdrawal.155 Provisions regarding the 
complementarity regime,156 the rights of victims and the accused,157 
the conduct of the proceedings,158 the grounds for appeal,159 and so 
on, are relatively standard.  
Of course, this drafting of the SCC statute required a number of 
policy decisions with which the international community may 
generally disagree. Where multiple international criminal tribunals 
provide different rights for victims, suspects, or defendants, the 
 
 154. Compare Draft Statute, infra app., art. 12 (presenting a simple, five-
paragraph article that sets forth whom the court may prosecute), with Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 119, art. 6 (mirroring the wording and 
structure of the attached Draft Statute, infra app., art. 12). 
 155. Compare Draft Statute, infra app., arts. 42-46, with Rome Statute, supra 
note 1, arts. 121-27 (providing similar mechanisms for amendment, review, 
accession, entry into force, and withdrawal). 
 156. Compare Draft Statute, infra app., arts. 16-17, with Rome Statute, supra 
note 1, art. 17 (containing almost identical language governing issues of 
admissibility and concurrent jurisdiction). 
 157. Compare Draft Statute, infra app., arts. 27-29, with S.C. Res. 1757, supra 
note 50, arts. 15-17 (adopting the rules governing the rights of suspects during 
investigation and the rights of the accused). 
 158. Compare Draft Statute, infra app., arts. 30-32, 34-41, with Rome Statute, 
supra note 1, art. 59 (using similar language to govern arrest proceedings), and 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 119, art. 19 (adopting 
language governing penalties), and S.C. Res. 1757, supra note 50, arts. 18, 20-21, 
23-27, 29-30 (establishing rules that govern pretrial and trial proceedings, powers 
of chambers, judgment, penalties, compensation to victims, appellate proceeding, 
enforcement of sentences, and pardon or communication of sentences). 
 159. Compare Draft Statute, infra app., art. 38 (allowing for appeals to the 
Appeals Chamber on procedural grounds, or when there is a question of law or 
fact), with Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 119, art. 20 
(settling disputes through negotiation or any other type of mutually agreed upon 
procedure). 
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appended draft generally adopts the most inclusive formulations.160 
For example, unlike the Rome Statute, it does not limit jurisdiction to 
actions committed only after the creation of the court161 because 
those national and international laws that will be enforced by the 
SCC are already in force. In addition, unlike the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, it does not create liability or special procedures for 
juvenile offenders.162 Although the Draft Statute’s provisions are 
more truncated than the Rome Statute for many topics, it does 
include the Rome Statute’s rather elaborate national security 
information protection regime—and actually strengthens it to make it 
concordant with this article’s preference that the court should take on 
a state-empowering structure.163  
There are many possible alternative scenarios that could be 
addressed. For example, if the international prosecutor is a national 
of the victim or alleged offender’s state, there may be a need for 
recusal and perhaps deferral of lead prosecution to the most senior 
Deputy Prosecutor or another professional international prosecutor. 
This article and appended Draft Statute leave such issues to be 
addressed by the court’s yet-unwritten rules of procedure and 
evidence.164 The Draft Statute is provided merely as a framework to 
begin contemplating how a permanent hybrid court might function. 
2. Broadening the Scope: The Special Court for Transnational Crime 
This article noted above that terrorism shares many of the 
attributes and characteristics of other transnational or “treaty” crimes 
(which are two distinct, but related, categories of crime). The drafters 
of the Rome Statute debated adding both kinds of crime to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, but found the marriage of international and 
transnational crimes to be an awkward one.165 This marriage is 
 
 160. See Draft Statute, infra app., arts. 27-29. 
 161. Compare Draft Statute, infra app., arts. 5-7 (remaining silent on the issue of 
prosecuting crimes committed before the enactment of the statute), with Rome 
Statute, supra note 1, art. 11 (authorizing jurisdiction for crimes committed only 
after the statute entered into force). 
 162. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 119, arts. 7(2), 
15(4) & (5), 19(1). 
 163. See Draft Statute, infra app., art. 33. 
 164. See Draft Statute, infra app., art. 21. 
 165. See Sonja Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: International 
Justice Beyond Crisis Situations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1257, 1270 (2007) 
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imperfect because there are a number of existential differences 
between the categories, including: whether the crime requires a 
gravity, or magnitude, threshold; whether the perpetrator is likely to 
be a private person or state-affiliated; whether a crime is conducted 
more against the international community or more against an 
individual state; and whether the motivation for the allegedly 
criminal conduct can—in some circumstances—justify the action. 
However, simply because international crime and transnational 
crime do not mesh well in the context of a single court does not mean 
that the international community cannot cooperate in the suppression 
of transnational crime. The proposed Special Court for 
Counterterrorism is one way to accomplish such cooperation, and it 
could even be expanded to include narcotrafficking and piracy. 
Piracy, though it is perhaps the oldest crime against the law of 
nations and technically not a treaty crime, contains characteristics 
that render it more practical to prosecute using methods similar to 
those used for transnational crimes166 such as human trafficking, 
attacks on U.N. personnel, organized crime, and so on. A working 
group could be convened to examine the practical possibilities of 
developing a wider subject matter jurisdiction for the appended 
permanent hybrid court for terrorism. Transnational crimes tend to 
share many features that have rendered them all similarly 
inappropriate for addition to the Rome Statute, but their similarities 
mean that a permanent hybrid court for terrorism could include other 
transnational crimes without any damage to the court’s design or 
function.  
Courts with subject matter of this kind already exist in some 
national criminal justice systems. For example, the Spanish Audencia 
Nacional hears only criminal cases involving terrorism, organized 
crime, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting;167 in Ireland, the Special 
 
(expressing a view that states refused to criminalize transnational crimes in the 
ICC, such as drug trafficking, because they were already adequately addressed by 
other international means). 
 166. See DUBNER, supra note 42, at 42 (commenting that piracy, as an offense 
under municipal law that is capable of occurring in international zones, should first 
be prosecuted at the municipal level, particularly because the characteristics of the 
crime can vary from state to state); Diaz & Dubner, supra note 42, at 200-03 
(noting an historical disagreement over the definition of piracy and “the traditional 
assertion that piracy is an offence or a crime against the law of nations”). 
 167. AUDENCIA NACIONAL, supra note 103. 
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Criminal Court hears terrorism and organized crime cases;168 and 
India has developed special terrorism courts as well.169 Thus, national 
courts have already recognized that transnational or complex crimes 
pose unique challenges as compared to domestic crime, but that due 
to their commonalities, these challenges can be approached through a 
single, unified court.  
A court of more general jurisdiction also has the advantage of 
reinventing itself or adjusting its jurisdiction to the kinds of 
transnational crime that emerge. For example, human trafficking and 
piracy are either emerging or reemerging as concerns when they 
were not so prominent only a few years ago.170 A general court, 
unlike a terrorism court, would be able to adjust its jurisdiction to 
include new transnational crimes. However, expanding the court may 
forgo the special condemnation that an exclusive counterterrorism 
court would bring.  
D. CAN THE CRIME OF TERRORISM BE INTEGRATED INTO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? 
This article next considers whether the crime of terrorism can be 
integrated into the jurisdiction of the ICC. Below is an in tandem 
discussion of the arguments supporting and opposing this addition. 
This section concludes by looking into whether the prosecution of 
crimes of terrorism would function more effectively if it had special 
procedures not shared by the other crimes. 
1. Arguments in Favor of Adding the Crime of Terrorism to the 
Jurisdiction of the ICC 
The arguments for adding the crime of terrorism to the ICC, rather 
than to a separate court, are of two kinds. First, there is judicial 
economy. If terrorism is successfully defined as an international 
crime, incorporated into the Rome Statute, and written carefully to 
involve only the most serious circumstances, a marginal increase in 
 
 168. Schools: About the Courts, supra note 103. 
 169. Diane Marie Amann, Guantánamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 342 
(2004). 
 170. See Leticia M. Diaz & Barry Hart Dubner, An Examination of the Evolution 
of Crimes at Sea and the Emergence of the Many Legal Regimes in Their Wake, 34 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 521, 566 (2009) (implying the need for an expansion 
of UNCLOS, or some other international means, to combat human trafficking). 
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litigation will not require the extra costs of establishing a new court 
with new personnel, procedures, and so on. The guiding body of law, 
the procedures of the court, and other procedural issues will all be 
settled without the need for substantial renegotiation. Creating a new 
permanent court would undoubtedly be a long and difficult 
process.171 
The second argument in favor of ICC jurisdiction is normative. 
Adding terrorism to the ICC rather than to a hybrid court means that 
it will almost certainly have to first be defined as an international 
crime. Incorporation into the Rome Statute could settle, once and for 
all, terrorism’s pedigree as a violation of the law of nations. This 
would unequivocally show that terrorism is among the most 
egregious forms of crime and that it is as deserving of the 
condemnation of nations as any other international crime. Perhaps 
this condemnation would have a deterrent effect greater than that 
achieved by a special hybrid court, although it bears repeating that 
the deterrent value of international criminal courts is hotly debated.172 
Stemming from terrorism’s codification as a crime against the law 
of nations, universal jurisdiction could flow from whatever definition 
of terrorism was enshrined in the Rome Statute. This could lower 
hurdles for acquiring jurisdiction over terrorists, but may also 
impinge state sovereignty in unwanted, and perhaps unanticipated, 
ways. 
2. Arguments Against Adding the Crime of Terrorism to the 
Jurisdiction of the ICC 
In addition to those points discussed in Section II(B) above, which 
oppose the addition of terrorism to any “international” court’s 
jurisdiction, there are political and practical considerations that 
particularly disfavor terrorism’s addition to the Rome Statute. 
a. Political Considerations 
As noted above, the international community has struggled to 
 
 171. See David Harris, Progress and Problems in Establishing an International 
Criminal Court, 3 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 1, 2-5 (1998) (identifying numerous 
substantial political and practical hurdles that delayed the creation of an 
International Criminal Court). 
 172. E.g., Alexander, supra note 99, at 4-5. 
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define terrorism and has struggled with the question of whether 
terrorism is an offense against the law of nations. It is simply 
unimaginable how such questions can be resolved in the near future 
so that the states parties to the Rome Statute might agree to 
incorporate terrorism into the jurisdiction of the ICC. Politically, 
states are concerned about losing control of national matters, the 
indictment of those they do not consider to be terrorists, and 
politically motivated prosecutions.173 Those fears are not allayed by 
the ICC’s structure, which gives an independent prosecutor a lot of 
power to choose who to charge. This wide discretion is evidenced by 
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s institutionally risky decision to 
indict a sitting head of state.174 Integrating terrorism will necessarily 
lead to an even greater number of legitimacy challenges for the court. 
The United States, as a global leader in the war against terrorism, 
has a number of concerns about the structure of the court that many 
states, powerful or not, may share. The United States may be 
concerned that the ICC is a “European” style body, controlled by 
many European nationals, which looks to what the United States 
considers to be expansive human rights law and imposes 
undeservedly low criminal sentences.175 In addition, the United States 
may well be concerned about interference from the international 
community in the global war on terrorism, including indictments of 
U.S. military servicemembers based on creative interpretations of 
any definition of terrorism, or interference with preventative 
detention of suspected terrorists.176 Other nations may be concerned 
about prosecution of whom they see as legitimate freedom fighters.177  
The United States has disfavored the incorporation of terrorism or 
drug crimes from the outset because of its view that they are 
 
 173. See, e.g., Alter, supra note 141, at 544 (addressing U.S. concerns that the 
powers granted to the ICC prosecutor could lead to politically charged 
prosecutions). 
 174. Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Presents Case 
Against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad AL BASHIR, for Genocide, Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes in Darfur, I.C.C. Doc. ICC-OTP-20080714-
PR341 (July 14, 2008). 
 175. Cerone, supra note 127, at 294. 
 176. See id. at 293 (listing high-ranking officials in the Bush administration that 
expressed anti-ICC sentiments). 
 177. Cassese, supra note 8, at 213-14. 
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incompatible with an international court.178 It has maintained the 
view that the creation of an international criminal court was intended 
to solve the problem of establishing new tribunals for each event in 
which the Security Council exercised its Chapter VII powers, and 
would have preferred referral mechanisms that relied on a 
determination by the Security Council, rather than independent 
initiation by the ICC Prosecutor.179 The United States has also been 
concerned about its own vulnerability, given its major, and often 
disproportionate, role in maintaining international peace and 
security. It would require strong complementarity regime protections 
to ensure national prosecutions are respected and sensitive security 
information is protected.180 The United States, despite its negative 
evaluation of the Rome Statute, has, by contrast, been very 
supportive of hybrid tribunals, due to the U.S. government’s faith in 
the value of national prosecutions and its confidence that U.S. 
nationals are not open to politically-motivated indictments.181 
Defining the crime of aggression has been on the agenda of the 
international community since the acts of the Nazi regime in the 
1930s and 1940s, but could not be flushed out until 2010, and even 
now its future is uncertain.182 Similarly, while modern international 
terrorism has been on the radar as an international security threat for 
decades, the crime of terrorism is also yet to be defined in a manner 
satisfactory to the international community at large. There is no 
convincing indication that the crime of terrorism can avoid the crime 
of aggression’s fate—that is, convening a working group to create an 
official definition that instead seems to prolong a slow collapse of 
consensus, until ultimately either no resolution or a problematic 
resolution is reached.  
Finally, political concerns over the inclusion of the crime of 
terrorism also suggest that adding it to the Rome Statute could cause 
states to refuse jurisdiction for the new crime, using their reservation 
power under Article 121, paragraph 5.183 Because new parties to the 
 
 178. Scheffer, supra note 59, at 12, 13. 
 179. Id. at 14-15. 
 180. Id. at 15. 
 181. Cerone, supra note 127, at 305-06. 
 182. Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 71, 73-82 (2010). 
 183. See e.g., de Gurmendi, supra note 81, at 604 (supporting the conclusion 
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statute do not have the choice to accept jurisdictional articles in a 
piecemeal fashion, adding the crime of terrorism to the Rome Statute 
could provide a disincentive for states who consider joining it. For 
example, new states may fear the ICC Prosecutor initiating ambitious 
prosecutions against their nationals or other interference with their 
national management of counterterrorism. 
b. Practical Considerations 
The crime of terrorism does not fit neatly into the ICC. Because 
even terrorist acts with a low number of casualties can have great 
political import, or be good candidates for international cooperation, 
it is possible that numerous terrorism cases would flood the ICC and 
distract from its original mandate of addressing much more 
widespread crimes. The ICC’s jurisdiction could be generally 
expanded or a separate “terrorism chamber” could be added, but both 
options degrade the judicial economy argument that otherwise 
supports integrating terrorism into the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
Additionally, states are in the best position to determine which 
cases should be referred, though there is room for the Security 
Council to be part of the process. Unlike the crimes which the ICC 
typically polices, the failure of state officials to fulfill their 
obligations to protect international peace and security are rarely at 
issue in international terrorism crimes.184 The ICC Prosecutor is not 
well-positioned to independently determine which cases to indict, 
nor would states be comfortable with him or her doing so. 
 3. Can the Crime of Terrorism Be Integrated Effectively into the 
ICC with Special Procedures? 
Many of the concerns with including the crime of terrorism in the 
ICC are procedural and relate to purposeless interference with state 
sovereignty. To address this issue, the most obvious solution is to 
remove independent initiation of cases by the Prosecutor from the 
 
that the wording of paragraph 5 suggests that only current parties can refuse new 
amendments). 
 184. See Scott M. Malzahn, State Sponsorship and Support of International 
Terrorism: Customary Norms of State Responsibility, 26 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 83, 90-91 (2002) (noting further that states are not open to criminal 
punishment in the same manner as natural persons, or even corporations—which 
could be subject to dissolution). 
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Rome Statute.185 This alteration would remove the most serious 
threat to state sovereignty and effective state handling of terrorism 
because cases could then only reach the ICC through state referral or 
a Security Council Chapter VII resolution.186 
Certain advantages of the hybrid court system would be lost if the 
ICC remains the only international court. The most obvious is the 
ability to enforce national proscriptions against terrorism alongside 
international ones. Recall that terrorism is often a crime directed 
against the community or government by private persons, and that 
states have an interest in achieving justice for their communities. 
Hybrid courts empower weaker legal systems with an infusion of 
international legal talent, particularly if the hybrid court can sit 
anywhere—as the ICC can—and takes full advantage of this feature. 
A hybrid court can also function without an international consensus 
on the definition of terrorism, and without relying solely on the 
thirteen backward-looking sectoral treaties.187 Furthermore, a hybrid 
court can compel unwilling states to accede to its jurisdiction, but 
without threatening state sovereignty.  
While small changes to the ICC’s procedure might address the 
unique legal and practical problems posed by terrorism trials—with 
the removal of independent initiation of proceedings being perhaps 
the most important alteration—the best results for international trials 
of terrorists cannot be achieved without serious alteration to the 
procedures that exist for other crimes. This is true much more so for 
terrorism than it is for the crime of aggression, which already faces 
uneasy integration into ICC procedures due to its unique features. At 
some point, the international community must ask itself whether it is 
institutionally worthwhile to create so many special procedures in the 
ICC, or whether it makes more sense to establish a new court with 
new procedures that are calibrated to the threats posed by 
transnational, rather than international crime. 
 
 185. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15 (allowing the Prosecutor to initiate 
investigations of crimes within the court’s jurisdiction). 
 186. Id. art. 13(a)-(b). 
 187. See Draft Statute, infra app., art. 6 (adopting the definitions described in 
these sectoral treaties, but providing a means by which other definitions can be 
added to the jurisdiction of the court). 
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CONCLUSION 
Our commitment to fighting terrorism is not diminished because 
the crime of terrorism is qualitatively different than the crimes 
proscribed by the Rome Statute. There is a role for the international 
community to bolster prosecution in weaker states, to deter 
noncompliance by holdout states, and to morally eviscerate any 
legitimacy that terrorist acts may enjoy in their audiences. But the 
need for states to remain active in suppressing transnational crimes 
that affect their nationals is strong. For this reason, this article 
suggests that if terrorism is to be tried by any international court, it 
should be a hybrid tribunal that applies national and international 
proscriptions on terrorism, encourages the involvement of national 
prosecutors, leaves jurisdiction with states that diligently suppress 
terrorism, and protects national security information.  
Appended to this article is a “Draft Statute of the Special Tribunal 
for Counterterrorism,” intended to begin a conversation about 
whether and how such a hybrid tribunal should be formed, and to 
raise issues that should be considered in designing any new court. It 
is hoped that the wisdom of different states and scholars, after 
reflecting on these ideas, will develop upon these initial sketches. 
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APPENDIX 
DRAFT STATUTE OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
The States Parties to this Statute, 
Mindful that thousands of children, women and men have been 
victims of terrorist crimes that deeply shock the conscience of 
humanity,  
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security 
and well-being of the world,  
Affirming that terrorist crimes must not go unpunished and that 
their effective prosecution can be ensured by taking measures at the 
national level and by enhancing international cooperation,  
Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for terrorist crimes, 
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes,  
Determined to these ends and to establish an independent 
permanent Special Court for Counterterrorism in relationship with 
the United Nations system, with jurisdiction over internationally and 
nationally proscribed terrorist crime,  
Emphasizing that the Special Court for Counterterrorism 
established under this Statute shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions,  
Resolved to deter and combat terrorism in States that are unable or 
unwilling to prosecute such offenders,  
Have agreed as follows  
SECTION I: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT 
Article 1 
The Special Court 
A Special Court for Counterterrorism (“Special Court”) is hereby 
established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the 
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons responsible for the 
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most serious terrorist crimes, as referred to in this Statute, and shall 
be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction 
and functioning of the Special Court shall be governed by the 
provisions of this Statute. 
Article 2 
Relationship of the Special Court with the United Nations 
The Special Court shall be brought into relationship with the 
United Nations through an agreement to be approved by the 
Assembly of States Parties to this Statute and thereafter concluded by 
the President of the Special Court on its behalf.  
Article 3 
Seat of the Special Court 
1. The seat of the Special Court shall be established at The Hague 
in the Netherlands (“the host State”).  
2. The Special Court shall enter into a headquarters agreement 
with the host State, to be approved by the Assembly of States Parties 
and thereafter concluded by the President of the Special Court on its 
behalf.  
3. The Special Court may sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it 
desirable, as provided in this Statute.  
Article 4 
Legal status and powers of the Special Court 
1. The Special Court shall have international legal personality. It 
shall also have such legal capacity as may be necessary for the 
exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.  
2. The Special Court may exercise its functions and powers, as 
provided in this Statute, on the territory of any State Party and, by 
special agreement, on the territory of any other State.  
SECTION II: JURISDICTION, ADMISSIBILITY AND 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Article 5  
Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Special Court  
The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who 
bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international 
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legal proscriptions on the crime of terrorism, listed in article 6, and 
appended national law proscriptions on terrorism, adopted by the 
procedures given in article 7. 
Article 6 
Crimes of terrorism in international agreements 
The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who 
committed the following crimes:  
(a) an offense described in the Convention on Offences and 
Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft of 14 September 
1963; 
(b) an offense described in the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 16 December 1970; 
(c) an offense described in the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 23 September 
1971; 
(d) an offense described in the Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons of 
14 December 1973; 
(e) an offense described in the International Convention against 
the Taking of Hostages of 17 December 1979; 
(f) an offense described in the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material of 3 March 1980; 
(g) an offense described in the Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil 
Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, of 24 February 
1988; 
(h) an offense described in the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 10 
March 1988 and its Protocol;  
(i) an offense described in the Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the 
Continental Shelf of 10 March 1988 and its Protocol; 
(j) an offense described in the Convention on the Marking of 
Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection of 1 March 1991;  
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(k) an offense described in the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 15 December 1997; 
(l) an offense described in the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999; 
(m) an offense described in the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 13 April 2005; and  
(n) Other acts such as may be added to this statute by the 
amendment procedure given in article 42. 
Article 7 
Crimes of terrorism under national law  
1. The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons 
who committed violations of national proscriptions on terrorism in 
the relevant jurisdiction.  
2. A State Party and the President of the Special Court may agree 
to append any national law proscriptions on crimes of terrorism that 
were characterized as terrorist crimes by national law and pre-
existing at the time of the alleged conduct. 
3. In order for the Pre-Trial Chamber to approve an indictment 
based on national law, appended by the procedure given in paragraph 
2, the relevant national law must have already been passed and 
publicized at the time of the commission of the alleged crime. The 
relevant national law must specify that it proscribes a terrorist crime 
and not be categorized as an ordinary crime. 
4. A State Party may refer a case to the Prosecutor in accordance 
with article 10 solely on alleged crimes of terrorism under 
international law, as in article 6, solely on alleged crimes of terrorism 
under national law, as in paragraph 2 of this article, or both.  
Article 8 
Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction 
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts 
the jurisdiction of the Special Court with respect to the crimes 
referred to in article 6 and may also consent to append additional 
crimes under the procedure given in article 7.  
2. In the case of the next article, paragraph (a), the Special Court 
may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States 
are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the 
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Special Court in accordance with paragraph 3: 
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question 
occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, 
the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;  
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a 
national; or 
(c) The State of which the intended and actual victim or victims of 
the alleged crime are nationals. 
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is 
required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged 
with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Special 
Court with respect to the crime in question. The accepting State shall 
cooperate with the Special Court without any delay or exception. 
Article 9 
Exercise of jurisdiction 
The Special Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a 
crime referred to in article 6 and 7 in accordance with the provisions 
of this Statute if: 
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to 
have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by an affected 
State Party in accordance with the next article; or 
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to 
have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations in accordance with article 11. 
Article 10 
Referral of a situation by a State Party 
1. An affected State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation 
in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Special 
Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to 
investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one 
or more specific persons should be charged with the commission of 
such crimes. 
2. As far as possible, a referral shall specify the relevant 
circumstances and be accompanied by such supporting 
documentation as is available to the State referring the situation.  
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3. In the case described in article 8, paragraph 1(c), in which the 
intended and actual victims of a State Party are targeted by a national 
or committed within the territory of a State that is not a Party to this 
statute, the State of nationality of the alleged offender may request 
the right to appoint an additional two ad hoc judges to the Trial 
Chamber and two ad hoc judges to the Appeals Chamber with 
jurisdiction over the case of its national. Such a request will be 
considered by the President of the Special Court, taking into 
consideration fairness to the defendant, transparency and 
participation concerns of the State of nationality of the alleged 
offender and a commitment by the State of nationality of the alleged 
offender to assist the Special Court in gaining custody over the 
alleged offender. The ad hoc judges will be appointed by the State of 
nationality of the alleged offender, subject to approval by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations (hereinafter “the Secretary-
General”). 
4. If multiple States Parties request the appointment of Deputy 
Prosecutors, national judges and appended national law for the same 
case, the President of the Court shall instruct the Parties to negotiate 
a division of responsibilities between themselves and to defer to the 
interests of the State with the greatest number of intended and actual 
victims in the case. In the event that no agreement can be reached, 
the President of the Special Court may decide, turning to equitable 
considerations, whether to award joint prosecution responsibilities to 
a single state, or whether to divide national prosecution 
responsibilities between multiple states and whether to append the 
national laws of multiple States. The President of the Special Court 
shall not consider requests for involvement from States Parties that 
do not submit a request for involvement within ten days of the first 
referral of the case to the Special Court by a State Party. 
Article 11 
Referral of a situation by the Security Council  
1. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations, may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in 
which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Special Court 
appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to 
investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one 
or more specific persons should be charged with the commission of 
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such crimes. 
2. The Security Council may refer a case in which a crime has 
been committed under article 6, or it may refer a case in which a 
crime has been committed under article 7, in accordance with the 
national law of the State or States of nationality of the intended and 
actual victim or victims of a terrorism offense. 
3. If the State or States of nationality of the intended and actual 
victim or victims are Parties to the Statute, they may request the 
appointment of a Deputy Prosecutor, national judges and appended 
national law within ten days of referral by the Security Council. 
4. If the State or States of nationality of the intended and actual 
victim or victims are not Parties to the Statute, they may accede to 
the Statute and proceed to initiate the requests in paragraph 3 of this 
article. 
5. If multiple States Parties request the appointment of Deputy 
Prosecutors, national judges and appended national law for the same 
referred case, the President of the Court shall instruct the Parties to 
negotiate a division of responsibilities between themselves and to 
defer to the interests of the State with the greatest number of 
intended and actual victims in the case. In the event that no 
agreement can be reached, the President of the Special Court may 
decide, turning to equitable considerations, whether to award joint 
prosecution responsibilities to a single state, or whether to divide 
national prosecution responsibilities between multiple states and 
whether to append the national laws of multiple states. The President 
of the Special Court shall not consider requests for involvement from 
States Parties that do not submit a request for involvement within ten 
days of the first referral of the case to the Special Court by the 
Security Council. 
Article 12 
Individual criminal responsibility  
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or 
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution 
of a crime referred to in articles 6 of the present Statute shall be 
individually responsible for the crime.  
2. The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head 
of State or Government or as a responsible government official, shall 
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not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate 
punishment.  
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 6 and 7 of the 
present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his 
or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had 
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or 
had done so and the superior had failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
perpetrators thereof.  
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a 
Government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal 
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if 
the Special Court determines that justice so requires.  
5. Individual criminal responsibility for the crimes referred to in 
article 7 shall be determined in accordance with the respective laws 
of the national legal jurisdiction.  
Article 13 
Jurisdiction over persons under eighteen years of age  
The Special Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who 
was under the age of eighteen at the time of the alleged commission 
of a crime. 
Article 14 
Mental element 
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally 
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Special Court only if the material elements are 
committed with intent and knowledge.  
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:  
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the 
conduct;  
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that 
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events. 
3. For the purposes of this article, “knowledge” means awareness 
that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary 
course of events. “Know” and “knowingly” shall be construed 
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accordingly.  
Article 15 
Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility 
1. In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal 
responsibility provided for in this Statute, a person shall not be 
criminally responsible if, at the time of that person’s conduct:  
(a) The person suffers from a mental disease or defect that 
destroys that person’s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or 
nature of his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct 
to conform to the requirements of law;  
(b) The person is in a state of intoxication that destroys that 
person’s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his or 
her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform to 
the requirements of law, unless the person has become voluntarily 
intoxicated under such circumstances that the person knew, or 
disregarded the risk, that, as a result of the intoxication, he or she 
was likely to engage in conduct constituting a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Special Court;  
(c) The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or 
another person or, in extreme cases, property which is essential for 
the survival of the person or another person, against an imminent and 
unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate to the degree of 
danger to the person or the other person or property protected;  
(d) The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Special Court has been caused by duress resulting 
from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious 
bodily harm against that person or another person, and the person 
acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the 
person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to 
be avoided. Such a threat may either be:  
(i) Made by other persons; or  
(ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person’s 
control. 
2. The Special Court shall determine the applicability of the 
grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this 
Statute to the case before it.  
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3. At trial, the Special Court may consider a ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility other than those referred to in paragraph 1 
where such a ground is derived from applicable international or 
national law. The procedures relating to the consideration of such a 
ground shall be provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
Article 16  
Concurrent jurisdiction  
1. The Special Court and the national courts of the States 
possessing criminal jurisdiction shall have concurrent jurisdiction.  
2. The Special Court shall have primacy over the national courts. 
At any stage of the procedure, the Special Court may formally 
request a national court to defer to its competence in accordance with 
the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  
3. The Special Court shall not exercise jurisdiction where: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which 
has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the 
person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which 
is the subject of the complaint. 
4. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the 
Special Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due 
process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the 
following exist, as applicable: 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national 
decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned 
from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Special Court; 
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which 
in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice; 
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted 
independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted 
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in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 
5. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Special 
Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to 
obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or 
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings. 
6. Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Special Court may be made 
by: 
(a) An accused or a person for whom a warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear has been issued; 
(b) A State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it 
is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or 
prosecuted. 
Article 17  
Ne bis in idem 
1. No person shall be tried before a national court of any State 
Party for acts for which he or she has already been tried by the 
Special Court.  
2. A person who has been tried by a national court for the acts 
referred to in articles 6 and 7 of the present Statute may be 
subsequently tried by the Special Court if the national court 
proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to 
shield the accused from international criminal responsibility or the 
case was not diligently prosecuted.  
3. In considering the penalty to be imposed on a person convicted 
of a crime under the present Statute, the Special Court shall take into 
account the extent to which any penalty imposed by a national court 
on the same person for the same act has already been served.  
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SECTION III: ORGANIZATION OF THE SPECIAL COURT 
Article 18 
Organs of the Special Court  
The Special Court shall consist of the following organs:  
(a) The Chambers, comprising a Pre-Trial Chamber, one or more 
Trial Chambers and an Appeals Chamber for each State Party whose 
national law is or will be applied in a case before the Special Court;  
(b) The Prosecutor;  
(c) The Registry, and 
(d) The Defense Office. 
Article 19 
Composition of the Chambers  
1. There shall be as many Chambers as there are States Parties 
with current cases before the Special Court. For each State Party, the 
associated Chambers shall be composed of at least [fifteen (15)] 
independent judges, who shall serve as follows:  
(a) [Three] judges shall serve in the Pre-Trial Chamber, of whom 
[one] shall be an ad hoc judge appointed by the State Party referring 
the case to the Special Court, and [two] judges appointed by the 
Secretary-General. 
(b) [Five] judges shall serve in the Trial Chamber, of whom [two] 
shall be a judge appointed by the State Party referring the case to the 
Special Court, and [three] judges appointed by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations (hereinafter “the Secretary-General”).  
(c) [Seven] judges shall serve in the Appeals Chamber, of whom 
[three] shall be judges appointed by the State Party referring the case 
to the Special Court, and [four] judges appointed by the Secretary-
General.  
2. Each judge shall serve only in the Chamber to which he or she 
has been appointed.  
3. The judges of each Chamber shall elect a presiding judge who 
shall conduct the proceedings in the Chamber to which he or she was 
elected. The presiding judge of the Appeals Chamber shall be the 
President of the Special Court.  
4. If, at the request of the President of the Special Court, an 
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alternate judge or judges have been appointed by the referring State 
Party or the Secretary-General, the presiding judge of that Chamber 
shall designate such an alternate judge to be present at each stage of 
the trial and to replace a judge if that judge is unable to continue 
sitting.  
Article 20 
Qualification and appointment of judges  
1. The judges shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality 
and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their 
respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices. 
They shall be independent in the performance of their functions, and 
shall not accept or seek instructions from any Government or any 
other source.  
2. In the overall composition of the Chambers, due account shall 
be taken of the experience of the judges in criminal law and 
procedure and international law.  
3. The international judges shall be appointed for a [five]-year 
period and shall be eligible for reappointment. The national judges 
shall be appointed ad hoc for each situation which is referred by or 
relegated to the joint prosecution of their associated State Party. 
Article 21 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Regulations of the Special 
Court 
1. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence shall enter into force 
upon adoption by a two-thirds majority of the members of the 
Assembly of States Parties. 
2. Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence may be 
proposed by: 
(a) Any State Party; 
(b) The judges acting by an absolute majority; or 
(c) The Prosecutor. 
Such amendments shall enter into force upon adoption by a two-
thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties. 
3. After the adoption of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in 
urgent cases where the Rules do not provide for a specific situation 
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before the Special Court, the judges may, by a two-thirds majority, 
draw up provisional Rules to be applied until adopted, amended or 
rejected at the next ordinary or special session of the Assembly of 
States Parties. 
4. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, amendments thereto and 
any provisional Rule shall be consistent with this Statute. 
Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as well as 
provisional Rules shall not be applied retroactively to the detriment 
of the person who is being investigated or prosecuted or who has 
been convicted. 
5. In the event of conflict between the Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, the Statute shall prevail. 
6. The judges shall, in accordance with this Statute and the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, adopt, by an absolute majority, the 
Regulations of the Special Court necessary for its routine 
functioning. 
7. The Prosecutor and the Registrar shall be consulted in the 
elaboration of the Regulations and any amendments thereto. 
8. The Regulations and any amendments thereto shall take effect 
upon adoption unless otherwise decided by the judges. Immediately 
upon adoption, they shall be circulated to States Parties for 
comments. If within six months there are no objections from a 
majority of States Parties, they shall remain in force. 
Article 22 
The Prosecutor  
1. The Prosecutor shall be responsible for the investigation and 
prosecution of persons responsible for the crimes falling within the 
jurisdiction of the Special Court. In the interest of proper 
administration of justice, he or she may decide to charge jointly 
persons accused of the same or different crimes committed in the 
course of the same transaction. 
2. The Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of 
the Special Court. He or she shall not seek or receive instructions 
from any Government or from any other source. 
3. The Prosecutor shall be appointed by the Secretary-General for 
a [five]-year term and shall be eligible for re-appointment. He or she 
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shall be of high moral character and possess the highest level of 
professional competence, and have extensive experience in the 
conduct of investigations and prosecutions of criminal cases.  
4. The Prosecutor shall be assisted by Deputy Prosecutors, one for 
each Party referring at least one active case to the Special Court, in 
the cases referred by or associated with that State Party, and by such 
other national and international staff as may be required to perform 
the functions assigned to him or her effectively and efficiently. The 
Deputy Prosecutors shall be referred to as the Deputy Prosecutor of 
their State of nationality. 
5. The Office of the Prosecutor shall have the power to question 
suspects, victims and witnesses, to collect evidence and to conduct 
on-site investigations. In carrying out these tasks, the Prosecutor 
shall, as appropriate, be assisted by the national authorities 
concerned. 
Article 23 
The Registry  
1. The Registry shall be responsible for the administration and 
servicing of the Special Court.  
2. The Registry shall consist of a Registrar and such other staff as 
may be required.  
3. The Registrar shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and 
shall be a staff member of the United Nations. He or she shall serve 
for a [five]-year term and be eligible for re-appointment.  
4. The Registrar shall set up a Victims and Witnesses Unit within 
the Registry. This Unit shall provide, in consultation with the Office 
of the Prosecutor, protective measures and security arrangements, 
counseling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims 
who appear before the Special Court and others who are at risk on 
account of testimony given by such witnesses.  
Article 24  
The Defense Office  
1. The Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the 
Special Court, shall appoint an independent Head of the Defense 
Office, who shall be responsible for the appointment of the Office 
staff and the drawing up of a list of defense Council. 
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2. The Defense Office, which may also include one or more public 
defenders, shall protect the rights of the defense, provide support and 
assistance to defense Council and to the persons entitled to legal 
assistance, including, where appropriate, legal research, collection of 
evidence and advice, and appearing before the Pre-Trial Chamber or 
a Chamber in respect of specific issues. 
Article 25 
Official and working languages 
The official languages of the Special Court shall be French and 
English. In any given case proceedings, a Chamber may decide that 
one of these, alone or in combination with any other language, may 
be used as a working languages or working languages, as 
appropriate. 
Article 26 
Annual Report  
The President of the Special Court shall submit an annual report 
on the operation and activities of the Special Court to the Secretary-
General and to the Government of any State Party which has referred 
a case to the Special Court, or any State Party which has lodged a 
request for the report that has been granted by the Secretary-General. 
SECTION IV: RIGHTS OF VICTIMS, SUSPECTS AND 
DEFENDANTS 
Article 27 
Rights of victims 
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the 
Special Court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented 
and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be 
appropriate by the Pre-Trial Chamber and in a manner that is not 
prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair 
and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the 
legal representatives of the victims where the Pre-Trial Chamber 
considers it appropriate. 
Article 28 
Rights of suspects during investigation 
A suspect who is to be questioned by the Prosecutor shall not be 
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compelled to incriminate himself or herself or to confess guilt. He or 
she shall have the following rights of which he or she shall be 
informed by the Prosecutor prior to questioning, in a language he or 
she speaks and understands: 
(a) The right to be informed that there are grounds to believe that 
he or she has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Special 
Court; 
(b) The right to remain silent, without such silence being 
considered in the determination of guilt or innocence, and to be 
cautioned that any statement he or she makes shall be recorded and 
may be used in evidence; 
(c) The right not be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or 
threat, to torture or to any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment; 
(d) The right to have legal assistance of his or her own choosing, 
including the right to have legal assistance provided by the Defense 
Office where the interests of justice so require and where the suspect 
does not have sufficient means to pay for it; 
(e) The right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he or 
she cannot understand or speak the language used for questioning; 
(f) The right to be questioned in the presence of Council unless the 
person has voluntarily waived his or her right to Council; 
(g) The right not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. 
Article 29 
Rights of the accused  
1. All accused shall be equal before the Special Court.  
2. The accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, 
subject to measures ordered by the Special Court for the protection 
of victims and witnesses.  
3. The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to the provisions of the present Statute. The onus is on the 
Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused. In order to convict the 
accused, the relevant Chamber must be convinced of the guilt of the 
accused beyond a reasonable doubt. 
4. In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant 
to the present Statute, he or she shall be entitled to the following 
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minimum guarantees, in full equality:  
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he 
or she understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him 
or her;  
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
or her defense and to communicate with Council of his or her own 
choosing;  
(c) To be tried without undue delay;  
(d) To be tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or 
herself in person or through legal assistance of his or her own 
choosing; to be informed, if he or she does not have legal assistance, 
of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in 
any case where the interests of justice so require, and without 
payment by him or her in any such case if he or she does not have 
sufficient means to pay for it;  
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or 
her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his 
or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or 
her;  
(f) To examine all evidence used against him or her during the trial 
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
Special Court; 
(g) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot 
understand or speak the language used in the Special Court;  
(h) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or herself or to 
confess guilt.  
SECTION V: CONDUCT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Article 30 
Pre-Trial proceedings 
1. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall review the indictment. If a 
majority of the Chamber is satisfied that a prima facie case has been 
established by the Prosecutor, the Chamber shall confirm the 
indictment. If the Pre-Trial Chamber is not so satisfied, the 
indictment shall be dismissed.  
2. The Pre-Trial Chamber may, at the request of the Prosecutor, 
2011] A PERMANENT HYBRID COURT 305 
issue such orders and warrants for the arrest or transfer of persons, 
and any other orders as may be required for the conduct of the 
investigation and for the preparation of a fair and expeditious trial, if 
the Chamber is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Special Court. 
Article 31 
Arrest proceedings in the custodial State 
1. A State Party which has received a request for provisional arrest 
or for arrest and surrender shall immediately take steps to arrest the 
person in question in accordance with its laws and in compliance 
with the procedures outlined in the request. 
2. A person arrested shall be brought promptly before the 
competent judicial authority in the custodial State which shall 
determine, in accordance with the law of that State, that: 
(a) The warrant applies to that person; 
(b) The person has been arrested in accordance with the proper 
process; and 
(c) The person’s rights have been respected. 
3. The person arrested shall have the right to apply to the 
competent authority in the custodial State for interim release pending 
surrender. 
4. In reaching a decision on any such application, the competent 
authority in the custodial State shall consider whether, given the 
gravity of the alleged crimes, there are urgent and exceptional 
circumstances to justify interim release and whether necessary 
safeguards exist to ensure that the custodial State can fulfill its duty 
to surrender the person to the Special Court. It shall not be open to 
the competent authority of the custodial State to consider whether the 
warrant of arrest was properly issued in accordance with the laws 
and procedures of the Special Court. 
5. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall be notified of any request for 
interim release and shall make recommendations to the competent 
authority in the custodial State. The competent authority in the 
custodial State shall give full consideration to such 
recommendations, including any recommendations on measures to 
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prevent the escape of the person, before rendering its decision. 
6. If the person is granted interim release, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
may request periodic reports on the status of the interim release. 
7. Once ordered to be surrendered by the custodial State, the 
person shall be delivered to the Special Court as soon as possible. 
Article 32 
Commencement and conduct of trial proceedings 
1. The Trial Chamber shall read the indictment to the accused, 
satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are respected, confirm that 
the accused understands the indictment and instruct the accused to 
enter a plea. 
2. Unless otherwise decided by the Trial Chamber in the interests 
of justice, examination of witnesses shall commence with questions 
posed by the presiding judge, followed by questions posed by other 
members of the Trial Chamber, the Prosecutor and the Defense. 
3. Upon request or proprio motu, the Trial Chamber may at any 
stage of the trial decide to call additional witnesses and/or order the 
production of additional evidence. 
4. The hearings shall be public unless the Trial Chamber decides 
to hold the proceedings in camera in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. 
Article 33 
Protection of national security information 
1. This article applies in any case where the disclosure of the 
information or documents of a State would, in the opinion of that 
State, prejudice its national security interests.  
2. This article shall also apply when a person who has been 
requested to give information or evidence has refused to do so or has 
referred the matter to the State on the ground that disclosure would 
prejudice the national security interests of a State and the State 
concerned confirms that it is of the opinion that disclosure would 
prejudice its national security interests. 
3. If a State learns that information or documents of the State are 
being, or are likely to be, disclosed at any stage of the proceedings, 
and it is of the opinion that disclosure would prejudice its national 
security interests, that State shall have the right to intervene in order 
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to obtain resolution of the issue in accordance with this article. 
4. If, in the opinion of a State, disclosure of information would 
prejudice its national security interests, all reasonable steps will be 
taken by the State, acting in conjunction with the Prosecutor, the 
defense or the Pre-Trial Chamber or Trial Chamber, as the case may 
be, to seek to resolve the matter by cooperative means. Such steps 
may include: 
(a) Modification or clarification of the request; 
(b) A determination by the Special Court regarding the relevance 
of the information or evidence sought, or a determination as to 
whether the evidence, though relevant, could be or has been obtained 
from a source other than the requested State; 
(c) Obtaining the information or evidence from a different source 
or in a different form; or 
(d) Agreement on conditions under which the assistance could be 
provided including, among other things, providing summaries or 
redactions, limitations on disclosure, use of in camera or ex parte 
proceedings, or other protective measures permissible under the 
Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
5. Once all reasonable steps have been taken to resolve the matter 
through cooperative means, and if the State considers that there are 
no means or conditions under which the information or documents 
could be provided or disclosed without prejudice to its national 
security interests, it shall so notify the Prosecutor or the Special 
Court of the specific reasons for its decision, unless a specific 
description of the reasons would itself necessarily result in such 
prejudice to the State’s national security interests. 
6. Thereafter, if the Special Court determines that the evidence is 
relevant and necessary for the establishment of the guilt or innocence 
of the accused, the Special Court may undertake the following 
actions: 
(a) The Special Court may request further consultations for the 
purpose of considering the State’s representations, which may 
include, as appropriate, hearings in camera and ex parte; 
(b) The Special Court may make such inference in the trial of the 
accused as to the existence or non-existence of a fact, as may be 
appropriate in the circumstances; or 
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(c) If the Prosecutor determines that he or she cannot proceed 
without the information, that the absence of the requested 
information does a material injustice to the accused, or has reason to 
believe that the State’s refusal to disclose the information is not in 
good faith, the Prosecutor may submit a request for dismissal with 
his or her grounds for doing so to the Pre-Trial Chamber, and the 
Pre-Trial Chamber may order the dismissal of the case. 
Article 34 
Powers of the Chambers 
1. The Special Court shall confine the trial, appellate and review 
proceedings strictly to an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by 
the charges, or the grounds for appeal or review, respectively. It shall 
take strict measures to prevent any action that may cause 
unreasonable delay. 
2. A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence that it deems to 
have probative value and exclude such evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial. 
3. A Chamber may receive the evidence of a witness orally or, 
where the interests of justice allow, in written form. 
4. In cases not otherwise provided for in the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, a Chamber shall apply rules of evidence that will best 
favor a fair determination of the matter before it and are consonant 
with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law. 
Article 35 
Judgment  
The judgment shall be rendered by a majority of the judges of the 
Trial Chamber or of the Appeals Chamber, and shall be delivered in 
public. It shall be accompanied by a reasoned opinion in writing, to 
which separate or dissenting opinions may be appended.  
Article 36 
Penalties  
1. The Trial Chamber shall impose upon a convicted person 
imprisonment for a specified number of years. In determining the 
terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chamber shall, as appropriate, have 
recourse to the practice regarding prison sentences in the other 
international criminal tribunals, as well as relevant national courts for 
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crimes under article 7.  
2. In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chamber should take into 
account such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual 
circumstances of the convicted person.  
3. In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chamber may order the 
forfeiture of the property, proceeds and any assets acquired 
unlawfully or by criminal conduct, and their return to their rightful 
owner or to the State of nationality of the victim or victims.  
Article 37 
Compensation to victims 
1. The Special Court may identify victims who have suffered harm 
as a result of the commission of crimes by an accused convicted by 
the Special Court. 
2. The Registrar shall transmit to the competent authorities of the 
State concerned the judgment finding the accused guilty of a crime 
that has caused harm to a victim. 
3. Based on the decision of the Special Court and pursuant to the 
relevant national legislation, a victim or persons claiming through the 
victim, whether or not such victim had been identified as such by the 
Special Court under paragraph 1 of this article, may bring an action 
in a national court or other competent body to obtain compensation. 
4. For the purposes of a claim made under paragraph 3 of this 
article, the judgment of the Special Court shall be final and binding 
as to the criminal responsibility of the convicted person. 
Article 38 
Appellate proceedings  
1. The Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons 
convicted by the Trial Chamber or from the Prosecutor on the 
following grounds:  
(a) A procedural error;  
(b) An error on a question of law invalidating the decision;  
(c) An error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.  
2. The Appeals Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise the 
decisions taken by the Trial Chamber.  
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Article 39 
Review proceedings  
1. Where a new fact has been discovered which was not known at 
the time of the proceedings before the Trial Chamber or the Appeals 
Chamber and which could have been a decisive factor in reaching the 
decision, the convicted person or the Prosecutor may submit an 
application for review of the judgment.  
2. An application for review shall be submitted to the Appeals 
Chamber. The Appeals Chamber may reject the application if it 
considers it to be unfounded. If it determines that the application is 
meritorious, it may, as appropriate:  
(a) Reconvene the Trial Chamber;  
(b) Retain jurisdiction over the matter.  
Article 40 
Enforcement of sentences  
1. Imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the 
President of the Special Court from a list of States that have 
indicated their willingness to accept persons convicted by the Special 
Court, giving due consideration and priority to the requests of a State 
of nationality of the victim or victims. 
2. Conditions of imprisonment shall be governed by the law of the 
State of enforcement subject to the supervision of the Special Court. 
The State of enforcement shall be bound by the duration of the 
sentence, subject to the next article of this Statute. 
Article 41 
Pardon or commutation of sentences  
If, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the 
convicted person is imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or 
commutation of sentence, the State concerned shall notify the Special 
Court accordingly. There shall only be pardon or commutation of 
sentence if the President of the Special Court, in consultation with 
the judges, so decides on the basis of the interests of justice and the 
general principles of law.  
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SECTION VI: AMENDMENT, REVIEW AND WITHDRAWAL 
Article 42 
Amendments 
1. After the expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this 
Statute, any State Party may propose amendments thereto. The text 
of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, who shall promptly circulate it to all 
States Parties. 
2. No sooner than three months from the date of notification, the 
Assembly of States Parties, at its next meeting, shall, by a majority 
of those present and voting, decide whether to take up the proposal. 
The Assembly may deal with the proposal directly or convene a 
Review Conference if the issue involved so warrants. 
3. The adoption of an amendment at a meeting of the Assembly of 
States Parties or at a Review Conference on which consensus cannot 
be reached shall require a two-thirds majority of States Parties. 
4. Except as provided in paragraph 5, an amendment shall enter 
into force for all States Parties one year after instruments of 
ratification or acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations by seven-eighths of them. 
5. Any amendment to articles 6 and 7 of this Statute shall enter 
into force for those States Parties which have accepted the 
amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not 
accepted the amendment, the Special Court shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when 
committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its territory. 
6. If an amendment has been accepted by seven-eighths of States 
Parties in accordance with paragraph 4, any State Party which has 
not accepted the amendment may withdraw from this Statute with 
immediate effect, notwithstanding article 46, paragraph 1, but subject 
to article 46, paragraph 2, by giving notice no later than one year 
after the entry into force of such amendment. 
7. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall circulate to 
all States Parties any amendment adopted at a meeting of the 
Assembly of States Parties or at a Review Conference. 
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Article 43 
Review of the Statute 
1. Seven years after the entry into force of this Statute the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Review 
Conference to consider any amendments to this Statute. The 
Conference shall be open to those participating in the Assembly of 
States Parties and on the same conditions. 
2. At any time thereafter, at the request of a State Party and for the 
purposes set out in paragraph 1, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations shall, upon approval by a majority of States Parties, convene 
a Review Conference. 
3. The provisions of article 42, paragraphs 3 to 7, shall apply to the 
adoption and entry into force of any amendment to the Statute 
considered at a Review Conference. 
Article 44 
Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
1. This Statute shall be open for signature by all States in [city], at 
[location], on [date]. Thereafter, it shall remain open for signature in 
[location] until [date].  
2. This Statute is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by 
signatory States. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval 
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
3. This Statute shall be open to accession by all States. Instruments 
of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. 
Article 45 
Entry into force 
1. This Statute shall enter into force on the first day of the month 
after the 30th day following the date of the deposit of the 30th 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to 
this Statute after the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession, the Statute shall enter into force 
on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the deposit 
by such State of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 




1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. 
The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of 
the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date. 
2. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, 
from the obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to 
the Statute, including any financial obligations which may have 
accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the 
Special Court in connection with criminal investigations and 
proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to 
cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the 
withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the 
continued consideration of any matter which was already under 
consideration by the Special Court prior to the date on which the 
withdrawal became effective. 
Article 47 
Authentic texts 
 The original of this Statute, of which the Arabic, Chinese, 
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, 
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
who shall send certified copies thereof to all States. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly 
authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this 
Statute. 
DONE at [city], this [date]. 
 
